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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal safety regulations for articles sold to the general public have been a 
feature of U.S. law for about the last century.  There is Federal government safety 
regulation of aircraft, automobiles, food, drugs, cosmetics, hazardous and toxic 
substances, and consumer products.2  Yet firearms have been subject to only limited 
Federal safety regulation.  This omission is surprising, since the potential of firearms 
to injure or kill humans is obvious.  Many firearms sold to the general public are 
marketed for purposes of hunting or various forms of formal or informal target 
shooting.  Yet any firearm that can kill an animal can also seriously injure or kill 
homo sapiens.  Moreover, many handguns are marketed with the specific goal of 
enabling users to defend themselves against human adversaries, and this goal 
requires at least the plausible threat to injure or kill.  Human nature and carelessness 
being what they are, it is evident that firearms may end up injuring or killing persons 
unintended by the shooter, including the shooter.  In spite of these risks, there has 
been little federal safety regulation of firearms. 
The issue of federal safety regulations for firearms is complicated by the 
vigorous debate over the desirability of private firearms ownership.  One side of the 
debate questions the legitimacy of private firearms ownership, or at least believes 
that such ownership should be subject to the grant of specific authority by the 
government (e.g., licenses or permits).  The other side contends that private firearms 
ownership has a long tradition in the United States, is supported by the U.S. 
Constitution and many state constitutions, and either does not harm or may actually 
improve public safety.  This debate has been going on for a long time and shows no 
sign of abating anytime soon.  Proposals to regulate the safety of firearms tend to be 
                                                                
2Aircraft safety is governed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 
731, Aug. 23, 1958, now codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44701-44672 (2003).  The safety of food, 
drugs and cosmetics is governed by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, June 25, 1938, 
ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1999).  The safety of automobiles is 
governed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. 102-240, Title II, Part B, Dec. 18, 1999, 105 Stat. 2081, codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 30101-30308 (2003).  The safety of herbicides and pesticides is governed by the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, June 25, 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163, presently 
codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2003).  The safety of household chemicals and children’s 
toys is governed by the  Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Pub. L. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372, July 
12, 1960, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2000).  The safety of consumer products in general is 
governed by the Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, October 27, 
1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084. 
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evaluated in light of how they might affect the private ownership of firearms.3  
Advocates of private firearms ownership are generally suspicious of proposals to 
subject firearms to safety regulation.  Firearms, they point out, have inherent risks 
and their criminal misuse is by far the greater problem.  Subjecting firearms to safety 
regulation would mean giving some authority the power to ban firearms with certain 
characteristics deemed to be “unsafe,” and this power could be used to ban firearms 
that advocates of private firearms ownership believe are legitimate for private 
persons to own. 4   Persons favoring safety regulation of firearms, on the other hand, 
point out that most other items of commerce are subject to safety regulation, yet 
those products remain in the marketplace.  Such persons point to the tragic accidents 
involving firearms, especially accidents involving children.  They also point to the 
presence or absence of various devices or features designed to enhance the safety of 
firearms.5  Reasonable people, they contend, should be able to understand that the 
safety regulation of firearms might prevent some of these accidents.  Resistance to 
safety regulations on the part of advocates of firearms private ownership, in this 
view, causes needless deaths and injuries based on unfounded fears that safety 
regulation will lead to prohibition. 
This article examines an aspect of the debate described above.  It begins by 
describing the federal firearms safety regulation that does exist and explaining the 
reason that there is relatively little federal firearms safety regulation.  It will then 
examine one legislative proposal to subject firearms to federal safety regulation, the 
Firearms Safety and Consumer Protection Act of 2003 (Firearms Safety Act)6 and 
compare it with the law that has been applied to seek to ensure the safety of other 
consumer products for over thirty years, the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)7.  
                                                                
3Such an evaluation is explicit in the second part of this article.  See infra notes 88 through 
289, and accompanying text. 
4David B. Kopel, Treating Guns Like Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1213, 1242-
46 (2000); David B. Kopel & Tim Wheeler, Guns v. Teddy Bears, NATIONAL REVIEW ON-
LINE, Jan. 13, 2004, at http:www.nationalreview.com/kopel/wheeler-Kopel200401130846.asp.  
Gun Violence Folly, WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003 at A18 (Commenting specifically on 
the Firearms Safety and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2403, 108th Cong. (2003). 
5For example, in introducing the Firearms Safety and Consumer Protection Act of 2003 
(S.1224), Senator Jon Corzine referred to magazine disconnectors and loaded chamber 
indicators as safety features that he believed to be desirable requirements for firearms. 
“Corzine, Kennedy Call for Gun Safety,” Press Release dated June 10, 2003.  Website of the 
Honorable Jon Corzine.  Consumer Federation of America has also advocated magazine 
disconnectors and loaded chamber indicators for handguns, as well as “safety locks” to make 
guns child-resistant.  It has criticized the design of the old model Ruger Blackhawk single-
action revolver as dangerous, as well as design characteristics of certain Remington Model 
700 bolt action rifles.  Consumer Federation of America has, however, mixed its safety 
message with complaints that some guns are unsafe because they are too concealable, too 
large and powerful and resemble military weapons too closely.  Consumer Federation of 
America, Health and Safety Standards for Everyday Products and Safety Standards that Could 
be Applied to Guns, http://www.consumerfed.org/products/pdf. 
6H.R.2403, 108th Cong. (2003) introduced by Rep. Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.). The 
companion senate bill was introduced by Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.).   
7Pub. L.92-573; 88 Stat.1207, Oct. 27, 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000). 
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That comparison will demonstrate that the genuine objective of the Firearms Safety 
Act has little to do with the safety of firearms in the hands of consumers, but is 
merely an excuse to hand virtually unlimited power over the firearms industry, and 
possibly some authority over firearms owners, to the Attorney General.  Advocates 
of private firearms ownership are, therefore, quite justified to be suspicious of 
legislative proposals purporting to regulate the safety of firearms. 
II.  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A.  SAAMI, Points and Criminal Misuse 
Congress clearly possesses the constitutional authority to regulate commerce in 
firearms.8  Since Congress has the power to regulate commerce in firearms, it also 
has the power to limit commerce in firearms that pose some sort of safety problems.  
Congress has, in fact, shown interest in firearms safety.  There were safety problems 
with firearms, especially during the transition that firearms underwent in the late 19th 
and early 20th century from propellants based on black powder to those based on 
smokeless powders.  Smokeless powders subjected firearms to greater pressures than 
those to which they had been previously been subjected, and attempts to fire 
cartridges filled with smokeless powder in firearms designed to withstand only the 
pressure limitations of black powder could destroy or seriously damage the gun, and 
injure or even kill the shooter.9  Using smokeless powder in a muzzle-loading 
firearm stressed only for black powder almost invariably led to similar disastrous 
results. 
To address these problems, Congress asked the manufacturers of firearms in 
1926 to form an association to establish standards that would protect shooters by 
standardizing the pressures that cartridges could generate and the pressures that the 
firearms designed to use them could withstand.  The manufacturers responded by 
forming the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute (SAAMI), 
which develops and publishes the standards to which firearms should be 
manufactured.  SAAMI is recognized by the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) as the association responsible for establishing the system of voluntary 
standards for firearms.  This system of SAAMI standards and proofing10 by 
                                                                
8U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 2 authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce in firearms has been upheld explicitly.  United States v. Fancher, 323 F. 
Supp. 1069, 1071-1072 (D.S.D. 1970); United States v. Gross, 313 F. Supp. 1330, 1332-1333 
(S.D. Ind. 1970), aff’d, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971).  Laws purporting to regulate commerce 
in firearms  have been overturned where the law had nothing to do with commerce in firearms 
(United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-64, (1995), or attempted to conscript local law 
enforcement officials in a federal regulatory program (McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 
321, 326-27 (1994), aff’d, 79 F.3d 452, 459-62 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118 
(1997), but upheld where the connection to interstate commerce could be demonstrated 
(United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 285-87 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1023 
(1999)). 
9For a discussion of some of the problems associated with smokeless powder, see W.W. 
GREENER, THE GUN AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 568-77 (1910). 
10Proofing is a process by which a firearm is subjected to charge of propellant powder 
considerably in excess of that likely to be encountered in ordinary service.  In the United 
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manufacturers or proof houses has largely eliminated the problem of firearms 
experiencing mechanical failures so severe that they risk endangering the shooter or 
bystanders.11   
The congressional request that led to the creation of SAAMI has not been the 
only federal legislative foray into safety.  The Gun Control Act of 196812 generally 
prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from authorizing the importation of firearms 
into the United States.13  The Act did create four categories of firearms that the 
Secretary must authorize for importation.14  One of those categories is a firearm that 
is generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting 
purposes.15  The Act did not, however, define the term “sporting purpose.”  In 
response to report language recommending that the Secretary of the Treasury 
establish an advisory council, the Secretary created the Firearms Evaluation Panel, 
an advisory group composed of representatives of the military, law enforcement, and 
the firearms communities.  On the basis of those recommendations, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco16 developed a system of “points” for handguns.17  
Guns with certain characteristics or features are awarded a certain number of points.  
In order to qualify for importation, a firearm must have a minimum number of 
points.18  While many of the points are awarded for features that bear no relation to 
safety (e.g., adjustable sights, target grips or target triggers), there are points awarded 
for certain safety features, apparently on the theory that “sporting purposes” meant 
“safer.”  Automatic pistols, for example, must have a “positive manual safety 
device.”  Such pistols also receive points for a locked breech mechanism, a loaded 
chamber indicator, a grip safety, a magazine safety, a firing pin block or lock, an 
                                                          
States manufacturers generally do their own proofing.  In Europe the process is carried out by 
independent proof houses.  SAAMI glossary proof test and definitive proof cartridge, at 
www.saami.org.  Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, Inc., official 
website of Sporting Arms & Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, at http://www.SAAMI.org 
(last modified Sept. 30, 2004). 
11Website of the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute (SAAMI), 
www.saami.org  Like other private standards setting bodies, the government has no formal 
oversight of SAAMI activities. 
12Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 
(1968). 
1318 U.S.C. § 922(1) (2000). 
14Most of the following discussion of the action of the Department of the Treasury in 
implementing the “sporting purposes” exception is found in Springfield Inc. v. Buckles, 116 
F.Supp.2d 85, 88-90 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 292 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
1518 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (2000). 
16Since January 24, 2003 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) is the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and is located within the Department of 
Justice.  Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1111; Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Nov. 25, 
2002, 6 U.S.C. § 531 (2003).  
17Sporting purposes criteria for rifles and shotguns center around their similarity to 
military weapons.  See Springfield Inc., supra at 89-90. 
18The point system is contained in a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
form labeled “Factoring Criteria for Weapons.” 
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external hammer and double action.19  Revolvers, by contrast, must pass a “Safety 
Test,” in which the hammer is retracted (automatically in the case of a double-action 
revolver and manually in the case of a single-action revolver) so that the firing pin 
does not rest on the primer of the cartridge.  The safety device must withstand the 
impact of the weight of the revolver dropping from a distance of three feet onto the 
hammer spur itself.  Both automatic pistols and revolvers receive extra points for 
frames constructed of either investment cast or forged steel, or of investment cast or 
forged HTS alloy, which enable the handgun to withstand greater pressures.   
The point system caused some changes in imported handgun designs in order to 
pass the safety test.  For example, some single-action revolvers based on the design 
of the Colt Model 1873 Single Action Army revolver were fitted with an extended 
base pin that could be slid rearward to block the fall of the hammer.20  When applied, 
this safety mechanism rendered accidental discharges resulting from a blow to the 
external hammer impossible, and the revolver could pass the safety test.21  Another 
effect of the imposition of the system on imports was to stimulate the domestic 
production of such handguns, since the “point system” did not apply to firearms 
manufactured in the U.S.22
                                                                
19For readers unacquainted with firearms terminology, a locked breach mechanism means 
that the barrel is physically connected to some other portion of the pistol, usually the slide, for 
a portion of its travel during recoil.  A “straight blow-back action,” by contrast, relies only on 
the inertia of the breechblock and the force of the spring to prevent the opening of the action 
prematurely when the gun is discharged.  Guns using low-power cartridges (.22 Long Rifle, 
.25 ACP, .32 ACP, and .380 ACP) are usually straight blow-back, while those using higher-
power cartridges (9mm Parabellum, .38 Super ACP and .45 ACP) usually incorporate a locked 
breech design.  A loaded chamber indicator provides the shooter with a visual or tactile 
indicator that a cartridge is in the chamber.  A grip safety is a device that must be depressed by 
the shooter’s hand position in order for the weapon to fire.  A magazine safety prevents the 
gun from firing if the magazine is not inserted in the magazine well, even if a cartridge is in 
the chamber.  A firing pin block or lock is a device that interposes itself to prevent the firing 
pin from reaching the primer of a cartridge in the chamber except through the normal firing 
process.  An external hammer is a hammer that is visible to the shooter and tells the shooter 
visually whether or not the weapon is cocked.  “Double-action” means a pistol that can either 
be cocked with the trigger or with the shooter’s thumb.  These definitions can be found in the 
glossary section on the SAAMI website, www.saami.org.  Whether all of these features 
actually improve handgun safety is a matter of debate among shooters and gun designers.  For 
an example of a critique of the double-action feature of automatic pistols, see JEFF COOPER, 
COOPER ON HANDGUNS 65 (1974); GREGORY MORRISON, THE MODERN TECHNIQUE OF THE 
PISTOL 81-82 (1991). 
20Hammerli, a Swiss manufacturer of handguns, adopted such a system.  COOPER, supra 
note 19, at 159. 
21The Colt Model 1873 Single Action Army was designed for the hammer to rest on an 
empty chamber, in which case there is no cartridge for the hammer to strike even if it is itself 
struck.  Id.  Some shooters suffered accidental discharges and were injured, either because 
they did not know of this recommended carrying practice, or choose to disregard it.  A similar 
system was used on the Ruger old model Blackhawk revolvers. 
22The 1968 law originally allowed the importation of parts for such guns, meaning that 
they could be assembled in the U.S.  This provision was eliminated in 1986 by the Firearm 
Owner’s Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-308, May 19, 1986, 100 Stat. 449, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(29)(B) (2000).  The legislative history is discussed in House Report No. 99-495, 4 
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The point system administered by the BATFE does show that a regulatory system 
for firearms that includes a safety component can be run for a number of years 
without having a prohibitory effect.  Foreign manufacturers continue to import 
pistols and revolvers and the point system has not been modified to require so many 
safety features or to add other “sporting purpose” requirements so as to become a de 
facto ban on handgun importation.  The BATF point system, however, applies only 
to imported firearms.  Consumers who wish to do so may purchase firearms 
manufactured in the U.S. to which the point system does not apply and 
manufacturers who wish to avoid subjecting their firearms to the point system may 
arrange to have them manufactured in the U.S.  Any attempt, therefore, to use the 
point system to achieve a prohibitory effect would have little effect other than 
probably to raise prices of domestically manufactured firearms in the absence of 
foreign competition.  In addition, the point system has never been subjected to any 
real objective scrutiny.  In theory, imported handguns subjected to the point system 
ought to be safer than domestically-produced handguns that do not have to meet its 
requirements.  But there is no indication that domestically-produced handguns are 
involved in a disproportionate number of accidental shootings than imported 
handguns.23  So the “point system” continues to be applied, and versions of it are 
generally the basis for state regulations of firearm, especially handgun, safety.24   
In addition to the limited federal legislative forays into firearms safety, there has 
been extensive federal legislation concerning firearms and the firearms industry, 
having as its objective the limiting of the criminal misuse of firearms.  The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives administers the Federal laws concerning 
firearms.25  A full discussion of all the laws and regulations concerning commerce in 
firearms is beyond the scope of this article,26 but a brief summary follows.  Firearms’ 
                                                          
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1327, 1328, 1350 (1986).  The change in the law led to the 
manufacture in the U.S. of small inexpensive .22 revolvers and .25 automatics, by companies 
such as Raven Arms, Davis Industries and Lorcin Engineering and Jennings Firearms.  John 
Mintz, Producing the Street Handguns of Choice is Mostly a Family Affair; Jennings Pistols 
are Inexpensive, Popular, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1994.  Manufacturers who continued to 
import into the U.S. modified the designs of their automatic pistols to acquire the necessary 
number of points.  COOPER, supra note 19, at 172-73. 
23A literature search conducted by the author revealed no report comparing the 
involvement of imported handguns versus domestically-produced handguns in firearms 
accident and a conversation with an official of the Firearms Technology Branch at the BATFE 
disclosed that he knew of no such comparison and that BATFE had never sought to make one.  
Such a comparison would be difficult to make since it would have to involve a statistically 
valid survey of accidental handgun discharges in which the imported versus domestically-
produced origin of the gun involved in the accident were known. 
24See infra, notes 114-116, and accompanying text.  
25About ATF, Mission, http://atf.gov/about/mission.htm. 
26For a discussion of the system of Federal regulation of commerce in firearms, see A. 
Braga, ET AL., The Illegal Supply of Firearms, 29 CRIME & JUSTICE 319, 321-24 (2002); 
Keersten Heskin, Easier to Obtain than a Driver’s License, 46 FLA. L. REV. 805, 817-25 
(1994); Harold Hurd, A Reexamination of the Firearms Regulation Debate and Its 
Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 214-16 (1997). The Supreme Court has referred to the 
firearms industry as a “pervasively regulated business.”  United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 
311, 316 (1972). 
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manufacturers, importers and dealers must all obtain federal licenses.27  The sale of 
certain types of firearms and ammunition is severely restricted:  short-barreled 
shotguns and rifles, machine guns, and armor-piercing ammunition.28  The sale of 
certain types of firearms is specifically permitted.29  All firearms must have serial 
numbers.30   
B.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission Becomes Involved 
1.  “Banning Bullets” 
The issue of federal safety regulations for firearms arose again at the creation of 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission.  When the bill that eventually became the 
CPSA was considered on the floor of the House of Representatives an amendment 
was offered that would have extended the definition of “consumer product” to 
include firearms and ammunition.31  The advocates of the amendment stated that 
firearms were associated with approximately 150,000 accidental injuries every year 
and that a federal safety agency concerned with consumer product safety ought to 
have the authority to investigate and possibly regulate the hazards associated with 
firearms.32  Opponents of the amendment, on the other hand, reasoned that the 
Commission might use product safety regulations as a way of establishing “gun 
control” through administrative action rather than legislation.33   The House 
considered but rejected the amendment by a voice vote.34  Thus the argument that the 
benefits of federal firearms safety regulation were outweighed by the risks of “gun 
control” through administrative action date from the outset of the formation of the 
Commission. 
Despite this seemingly clear direction to stay away from regulation of firearms 
and ammunition, the Commission did become involved in controversies associated 
with the regulation of ammunition.  One of the laws that Congress gave the 
                                                                
2718 U.S.C. §§ 922-923 (2000). 
28The sale of armor-piercing ammunition is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(7) (2000).  The 
sale of short-barreled rifles and shotguns and machine guns is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) 
(2000).  The sale of semi-automatic assault weapons was formerly limited by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(v)(1) (expired Sept. 13, 2004). 
29The firearms contained in Appendix A are specifically found not to be semi-automatic 
assault weapons.  By implication, therefore, they may be manufactured and sold to the general 
public.  18 U.S.C. § 922 (v)(l), app. A (2000).  Note that the statute banning semi-automatic 
assault weapons expired by its own terms on Sept. 12, 2004. 
3018 U.S.C. § 922(k). 
31118 Cong. Rec. 31406, September 20, 1972. 
32Id.  Remarks of Rep. Bingham. 
33Id. 31406-07.  Remarks of Reps. Wiggins and Randall. 
34Id.  Section 3(a)(1)(E) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(E)(2000), excludes from the 
definition of “consumer product”, “any article which, if sold by the manufacturer, producer, or 
importer, would be subject to the tax imposed by Section 4181 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 [a 10% excise tax on pistols and revolvers and an excise tax of 11% on other firearms 
and ammunition] . . . or any component of such article.”  
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Commission the authority to administer was the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
(FHSA).35  Not long after the Commission began operation, Chairman Richard 
Simpson stated that while firearms were exempted from the Commission’s 
jurisdiction under the CPSA, the Commission “could probably ban bullets” by virtue 
of its authority under the FHSA.36  In response to a letter inquiring about the 
Chairman’s remarks, the Commission’s Office of the General Counsel replied that 
small arms ammunition was a “hazardous substance” within the meaning of Sections 
2(f)(1)(A)(vi) and 2(q)(1)(B) of the FHSA.37  The FHSA permits the sale of 
hazardous substances as long as they are properly labeled.38  But the Office of the 
General Counsel letter also contained an ominous reference to a “banned hazardous 
substance,”39 which cannot be sold to consumers regardless of the labeling.  The 
opinion did state that “to date, no ordinary ammunition has been determined to be a 
banned hazardous substance” (emphasis added), but it did not state what it 
considered to be “ordinary” ammunition.40  
This interpretation of the FHSA left the Commission just one “finding” away 
from banning firearms ammunition, a development that would eliminate the utility of 
                                                                
35Pub. L. 86-613; 74 stat. 372, July 12, 1960, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2000).  
Section 30(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (2000)) transferred 
authority to administer the FHSA to the Commission.  Prior to the establishment of the 
Commission, the FHSA had been administered by the Food and Drug Administration.   
36The statement was made during a talk before the 4th Annual Product Liability 
Prevention Conference and was referred to in a letter from the Commission General Counsel 
Michael Brown to Neal Knox, dated December 20, 1973 and also to Russell I. Jenkins, dated 
January 2, 1974.  The Chairman’s remarks appear not to have addressed the issue of the 
exclusion of ammunition from the definition of consumer product within the meaning of the 
CPSA. 
3715 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A)(vi), (q)(1)(B) (2000).  Section 1261 (f)(1)(A)(vi) identifies as 
a hazardous substance “any substance or mixture of substances which . . . generates pressure 
through decomposition, heat, or other means, if such substance or mixture of substances may 
cause substantial personal injury . . . during or as a proximate result of any customary or 
reasonably foreseeable handling or use.” 
38If an item is a hazardous substance it must bear a label that meets the requirements of 
FHSA § 2(p)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)-(2) (2000), or it is considered a misbranded 
hazardous substance.  It is unlawful to introduce or to deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce a misbranded hazardous substance.  Id. § 4(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1263(a) (2000). 
39A banned hazardous substance is defined, by FHSA § 2(q)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1261(q)(1)(B) (2000) as “any hazardous substance intended, or packaged in a form suitable 
for use in the household, which [the Commission] by regulation classifies as a ‘banned 
hazardous substance’ on the basis of a finding that, notwithstanding such cautionary labeling 
as is or may be required under this Act for that substance, the degree or nature of the hazard 
involved in the presence or use of such substance in households is such that the objective of 
the protection of the public health and safety can be adequately served only by keeping such 
substance, when so intended or packaged, out of the channels of interstate commerce.  
Exemptions were required for chemical sets and common fireworks. Id.  Section 4(a) of the 
FHSA, 15 U.S.C. § 1263(a) makes it unlawful to introduce, or to deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any banned hazardous substance. 
40Letters from Commission’s General Counsel Michael Brown to Neal Knox (Dec. 20, 
1973) and to Russell I. Jenkins (Jan. 2, 1974). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
234 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:225 
firearms.  The Commission, however, never sought to declare small arm ammunition 
to be a banned hazardous substance, and contented itself with labeling 
requirements.41  There was, however, an effort to change that situation within less 
than six months.  Citizens for Hand Gun Control, a group advocating increasing the 
restrictions on private ownership of handguns, petitioned the Commission on June 
22, 1974, asking it to ban the sale, distribution, and manufacture of handgun 
ammunition as a banned hazardous substance under the FHSA.42  The Commission 
decided, however, that the requested ban on handgun ammunition would constitute a 
ban on handguns themselves.  The Commission, therefore, denied the petition, 
reasoning that Congress, by expressly excluding firearms and ammunition from the 
definition of “consumer product” had not conferred the authority on the Commission 
even to consider such a petition.43  The plaintiffs sought judicial review of the 
Commission’s decision and asked the court, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment 
that the Commission did have the authority to declare handgun ammunition to be a 
banned hazardous substance, and to prohibit its manufacture, sale and distribution 
except for use by the military, police, security guards and licensed pistol-shooting 
clubs.44  The reviewing court held that the Commission had erred in dismissing the 
petition.  The court reasoned that, while Congress had specifically denied the 
Commission jurisdiction over firearms and ammunition in passing the CPSA, 
Congress had never amended the FHSA to make it clear that the Commission had no 
jurisdiction over ammunition under that statute.45  The court, therefore, ordered the 
Commission to consider the merits of the petition, although it noted that even the 
petitioners considered it unlikely that the Commission would grant the requested 
relief because of the extensive findings that would be required to support the 
selective ban.46  The Commission then began soliciting comments on the petition.47
Before the Commission could get very far in the court-ordered regulatory 
proceeding, however, Congress intervened.  Section 3 of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission Improvement Act of 197648 made a technical change in the 
                                                                
41The labeling requirements were found in 16 CFR § 1500.83(a)(6) (1974).  They included 
the common or usual name of the ammunition in the container, a statement, “Warning—Keep 
Out of the Reach of Children,” and the name and place of business of the manufacturer, 
packer, or seller or distributor.  Sen. Rep. No. 91-251 at 6 (1975), accompanying S.644. 
42Committee for Hand Gun Control, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm., 388 F. 
Supp. 216, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
43The denial of the petition by the Commission occurred on September 5, 1974.  
Commission Press Release #75-016, (Feb. 14, 1975). 
44Committee for Hand Gun Control, Inc., supra at 219.  While such exceptions were 
probably concessions to political reality, any ban the Commission could have imposed on 
handgun ammunition would have been limited to “its presence or use in households,” by the 
terms of the FHSA.  Banning handgun ammunition in households would, of course, have been 
a regulatory decision with enormous consequences. 
45Id. at 218. 
46Id. at 220-21. 
47“Petition on Handgun Ammunition Published in Federal Register,” Commission Press 
Release #75-016 (Feb. 14, 1975). 
48Pub. L. 94-248, 90 Stat. 503, May 11, 1976. 
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CPSA, so as to make it clear that the Commission had no authority under the FHSA 
to regulate either firearms or ammunition.49  In case the Commission remained in any 
doubt about its lack of authority over firearms and ammunition, Section 3(e) of the 
1976 law stated explicitly:  “The Consumer Product Safety Commission shall make 
no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture or sale of firearms, firearms 
ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition, including black powder or 
gunpowder for firearms.”  The legislative history of Section 3 of the 1976 law made 
clear that Congress intended to nullify the decision of the district court in the 
Committee for Hand Gun Control case.50  One sponsor of the bill stated explicitly 
that Congress had never intended to give the Commission the authority to regulate 
firearms and ammunition, and described the amendment to the CPSA as “a major 
victory for those Americans who believe in the Constitutional right to bear arms.”51 
The Commission repealed its labeling regulations for small arms ammunition in the 
aftermath of the 1976 amendments to the CPSA.52  That legislation is the last word 
from Congress on the Commission’s lack of authority to regulate firearms and 
ammunition.  Congressional hostility to Commission involvement with guns has 
been so profound that jurisdiction over the requirements for the markings on toy guns 
was given to the Department of Commerce, not the Commission,53 even though the 
Commission regulates all other toys.54
2.  Recent Activities 
The Commission has had very little occasion to contemplate the nature or extent 
of the exclusion of firearms and ammunition from its jurisdiction.  The Commission 
has asserted jurisdiction over air guns, and has cooperated with manufacturers to 
                                                                
49A sentence was added to CPSA § 3(a)(1) (15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(2000)) that stated:  
“Except for the regulation of [fireworks and components] the Commission shall have no 
authority under the functions transferred pursuant to Section 30 of this Act [including the 
transfer of the authority to administer the FHSA] to regulate any product or article described 
in subparagraph (E) of this paragraph [firearms and ammunition] . . .”  The exclusion also 
included antique firearms supplies. 
50S. Rep. No. 94-251, (1975) at 2, 6 accompanying S. 644; H.R. No. 94-1022 at 15-16. 
51S. Rep. No. 94-251, (1975) at 41 (noting the separate views of Senator Moss). 
5244 Fed. Reg. 42677-78 (July 13, 1979). 
5315 U.S.C. § 5001(b)(l) (2002) requires a blaze orange plug be inserted into the barrel of 
a toy, look-alike or imitation firearm.  Placing the authority to regulate toy, look-alike and 
imitation firearms in the Department of Commerce and not the Commission was at the 
insistence of the Honorable John D. Dingell (D-MI), who was then the Chairman of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce.  Personal recollection of the author, who was a counsel 
for the Republican Members of the Energy and Commerce Committee at the time; see also 
Letter from the Honorable John D. Dingell, Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives to the Honorable Ann W. Brown, 
Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, concerning markings on toy guns. 
(“Dingell to Brown letter”) (Aug. 8, 1995) (on file with the author). 
54FHSA § 2(f)(1)(D) (15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(D) (2000) includes in the definition of 
“hazardous substance,” “any toy or other article intended for use by children which the 
[Commission] by regulation determines, in accordance with Section 3(e) of this Act, presents 
an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard.” 
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conduct several recalls of such guns.55  One of the Commission’s most controversial 
cases involved Daisy Model 856 and 880 air rifles.56  The Commission has also 
conducted recalls of equipment associated with shooting and hunting,57 and a 
Commission regulation on child-resistant packaging for hydrocarbons applies to gun 
cleaning solvents,58 but none of these recalls or regulations was intended to reduce 
the chance of an injury or death resulting from the accidental discharge of a firearm.  
When Ann Brown became Chairman of the Commission in 1994, there were some 
indications that she would push for statutory amendments to give the Commission 
jurisdiction over firearms, but the election of a Republican majority to Congress in 
1994 made such a development very unlikely.59  Chairman Brown even tried to take 
                                                                
55The Commission has conducted several recalls of air guns in cooperation with 
manufacturers.  “CPSC, Crosman Corporation Announce Recall of Air Rifles,” Press Release 
#04-001 (Oct. 2, 2003); “CPSC and Gamo USA Announce Recall of BB Air Pistols,” Press 
Release #97-140 (June 9, 1997); “Benjamin-Sheridan Corp. Recalls Co2 and Pneumatic 
Airguns,” Press Release 92-140 (Sept. 23, 1992); “CO2 Pistol Modification Announced by 
Smith & Wesson and Daisy,” Commission Press Release #83-066 (Dec. 1983); “Daisy BB 
Guns Recalled,” Press Release #79-104 (Apr. 2, 1979).   
56Complaint, In the Matter of Daisy Manufacturing Co., CPSC Docket No. 02-2, Oct. 30, 
2001.  See also, “Statement of the Honorable Mary Sheila Gall in Opposition to Issuance of 
Administrative Complaint Against Daisy Manufacturing Company,” attachment to 
Commission Press Release #02-029, “CPSC Files Lawsuit Against Daisy Manufacturing Co. 
To Recall Two Models of Daisy’s Powerline Airguns Due To Defects” (Oct. 30, 2001).  J. 
Norell, BB Guns & Gun Control ABCs, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, Jan. 2002 at 40, 41, 81; W. 
LaPierre, Standing Guard, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN, Jan. 2002 at p.12, Jan. 2002.  “CPSC, Daisy 
Manufacturing Co. Settle Lawsuit Concerning Powerline Airguns,” Commission Press 
Release #04-033 (Nov. 14, 2003);  “Daisy Manufacturing Company, Provisional Acceptance 
of Settlement Agreement and Order,” 68 Fed. Reg. 68876-68878, (Dec. 10, 2003).  The 
Commissions decision was changed by the parents of a young man injured by the discharge of 
a Daisy Air rifle, however, the case was dismissed.  Mahoney v. CPSC, No. 04-1833, 2004 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 19647 (2004).  See generally Triggering Liability: Teenage Shooting Opens a 
Window on Safety Agency, WALL ST. J., Apr., 29, 2004 at A.1, A.6. 
57The Commission participated with the manufacturer to recall a holster with a strap  
associated with the accidental discharge of Glock Series 17 and Series 19 handguns when the 
user inserted them into the holster.  “CPSC, First Samco Inc. Announce Recall to Replace Gun 
Holsters,” Commission Press Release #04-155, (June 9, 2004).  The Commission has been 
involved in the recalls of a tumbler that cleans empty cartridge cases (“brass”) prior to the 
reloading of these cases.  “CPSC, Midway Arms Announce Recall of Tumblers,” Commission 
Press Release #98-088 (Mar. 27, 1998).  The Commission has also been involved in the recalls 
of a number of hunting tree stands and some tree stand accessories.  CPSC, API Outdoors 
Announce Recall of Hunting Treestands,” Commission Press Release #03-027 (Oct. 30, 
2002).   
58Commission regulations under the FHSA require that some gun cleaning solvents be 
packaged in child-resistant packaging.  “Household Products Containing Hydrocarbons,” Final 
Rules, 66 Fed. Reg. 53951, 53952 (Oct. 25, 2001). 
59The author was told in the summer of 1995 by a member of Chairman Brown’s 
immediate staff that members of Chairman Brown’s staff had been in touch with the 
leadership of the National Rifle Association (NRA).  Reportedly this involved at least one 
meeting between the staff member, the Commission’s General Counsel and the Commission’s 
Director of Congressional Relations.  The NRA leadership was reportedly not receptive to the 
overtures to give the Commission jurisdiction over firearms. 
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steps to change the markings on toy guns, a product over which Congress, as noted 
earlier, had given jurisdiction to the Department of Commerce.60   
The Commission did confront the jurisdictional issue indirectly when it began to 
deal with perceived problems in gun safety locks in 2000.  Gun locks are devices 
designed to be attached to firearms, particularly handguns, to prevent their accidental 
discharge.61  Commission General Counsel Michael Solender stated62 that gun locks 
were not “component parts” of pistols, revolvers, or firearms within the meaning of 
the pertinent regulations63 of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).  
The Commission counsel’s opinion referred to BATF regulations that required that a 
component part ordinarily be attached to a firearm during use.64  Solender reasoned 
that firearm locking devices were sold with the specific intent of preventing the 
firearm from discharging and must be removed in order for the firearm to be used. 
Therefore, such devices could not be components of a firearm that would be attached 
during use.65  The Commission cooperated with manufacturers of firearm locks in 
                                                                
60The author attended a meeting on July 27, 1995 between representatives of the Law 
Enforcement Alliance, Chairman Brown and other Commission staff concerning marking on 
toy guns.  The meeting was listed as being with Strombecker Corporation, the Office of 
Chairman Brown and the Commission’s Office of Congressional Relations on July 27, 1995.  
A further meeting on the toy gun issues took place on November 17, 1995 between Chairman 
Brown and representatives of Strombecker Corporation.  1995 Annual Report to Congress, 
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission p. C-21.  See also, Dingell to Brown 
Letter, infra note 53. 
61For example, Master Lock sells Number 90 and Number 94 padlocks for firearm 
triggers.  The National Shooting Sports Foundation sponsors a “Childsafe” program, which 
provides consumers with a free cable lock for firearms.  www.projectchildsafe.org.  In general 
such locks are designed to prevent access to firearms by children, although the amount of 
resistance that such locks must offer to a person seeking to remove them and gain access to a 
firearm has been the subject of debate within the voluntary standards setting process and 
California gun lock regulations.  The characterization of the ASTM process is based on the 
author’s personal conversation with Commission staff who are participating in the voluntary 
standards setting process.  See also, Safety Standards Sought After Gun Locks Fail Test, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2001 at A1 and A10.  The California firearm lock requirements are found 
at Code of California Regulations Title 11, Division 1, Chapter 12.6, effective February 1, 
2001. 
62Opinion of Michael S. Solender, General Counsel, U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, “Commission Jurisdiction over Separate Firearm Trigger Locks” (July 12, 2000) 
[hereinafter “Solender Trigger Lock Opinion”]. 
6327 C.F.R. Part 53 (1999) (as cited in the Solender Trigger Lock Opinion). 
6427 C.F.R. § 53.61(b)(2) (1999) (as cited in the Solender Trigger Lock Opinion). 
65Solender Trigger Lock Opinion, p.3.  The Solender Trigger Lock Opinion is well 
reasoned, but it is possible to argue that a firearm lock is a component because it interacts with 
the firearm mechanism to prevent operation in a manner similar to a mechanical safety 
incorporated into the firearm.  No manufacturer or distributor of such locks has, however, 
attempted to make such an argument and doing so would probably subject such a lock to an 
11% excise tax as a “firearm.”  The Solender Trigger Lock Opinion similarly did not deal with 
the jurisdictional issue of “smart gun technology,” which operates to prevent firing unless the 
mechanism is itself manipulated or the gun itself recognizes that the operator is authorized to 
fire it.  See, M. Kasindorf & G. Fields, Reluctant industry pursues ‘smart’ guns, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 27, 2000 at 1A, 10A.  Some officials at the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco 
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announcing three recalls,66 and Commission staff is presently participating in two 
ASTM67 subcommittees devoted to writing standards for firearms locking devices 
and firearm security storage containers.68
This historical retrospective demonstrates quite clearly that Congress has chosen 
to rely principally on voluntary efforts within the private sector to ensure the 
reasonable safety of firearms.  There has been considerable legislation concerning 
commerce in firearms, but Congress has, with limited exceptions, not legislated in 
the area of firearms safety.  It has not done so because of fears that regulation in the 
name of safety could be used to ban or severely restrict commerce in firearms, which 
do have inherent safety risks.  Congress has acted swiftly and decisively when it 
appeared that the agency charged with consumer product safety might try, or be 
forced, to exercise that authority in the area of firearms.  Yet Congress has also 
permitted a system of imported handgun regulation that includes safety components 
as part of a “sporting purpose” test where that system was limited to imported 
firearms and where it has not been administered with the effect of seeking to prohibit 
firearm imports. 
III.  THE FIREARMS SAFETY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2003 
Not all Members of Congress have agreed with the general “hands-off” approach 
that Congress has taken towards firearms safety regulation as an institution.  Senator 
Jon Corzine (D-N.J.) is the principal sponsor of the Firearms Safety Act, along with 
Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.) in the House of Representative.  In a joint 
press release Senator Corzine and Representative Kennedy stated that they had 
introduced the Firearms Safety Act “to apply to firearms health and safety standards 
                                                          
reportedly expressed the view that the Commission should have jurisdiction over such 
systems, but that has never been the official view of the BATF and the Commission has not 
sought any explicit regulatory authority for such “smart gun technology.”  Personal 
recollection of the author, who was Senior Legal Counsel to Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall 
at the time. 
66“CPSC, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. Announce Recall to Replace Padlocks and 
Cable Gun Locks,” CPSC Press Release #01-148 (May 9, 2001);  “CPSC, National Shooting 
Sports Foundation Announce Recall to Replace Project HomeSafe Gun Locks,” CPSC Press 
Release #01-078 (Feb. 7, 2001); “CPSC, Master Lock Co. Announce Recall to Replace Gun 
Locks,” CPSC Press Release #00-149 (July 24, 2000). 
67ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials) is one of 
a number of U.S. organizations that coordinate the development of voluntary standards 
through a consensus process. 
68ASTM Subcommittee F.15.53 is considering the standard for non-integral firearm 
locking devices (limited to cable and trigger locks), and ASTM Subcommittee F.15.55 is 
considering the standard for firearm security containers (gun lock boxes).  Legislation has 
been introduced to require the Commission to promulgate mandatory requirements for firearm 
locking devices.  E.g., H.R. 1962, introduced on May 6, 2003 by Rep. Elliot Engel (D-N.Y.); 
S.866, introduced on April 10, 2003 by Sen. Herbert Kohl, (D.-Wisc.).  That legislation has 
never been the subject of a hearing or a markup.  The State of California has mandatory state 
requirements for firearm locking devices.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 12088.2.  California 
Department of Justice Regulations, chap. 12.6, §§ 977.10—977.90. 
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similar to those that apply to virtually all other products sold in America.”69  Senator 
Corzine stated that poorly manufactured, cheap quality guns pose a threat and that 
there was no regulatory mechanism to recall defective guns or require warning 
labels.  He gave specific examples of magazine disconnectors and loaded chamber 
indicators70 as safety features that he believed would make firearms less likely to be 
involved in an accident.  The press release also claimed that firearms manufacturers 
have made guns more likely to be used in crime and more deadly, citing 
concealability, large ammunition capacity and “larger, more lethal ammunition.”71  
The sponsors claimed that the bill had the support of more than one hundred twenty 
national, state and local organizations. 
The Firearms Safety Act contains a number of provisions.  It delegates to the 
Attorney General both the authority and the duty to promulgate regulations 
governing the design, manufacture, and performance of, and commerce in, firearms 
products.72  Firearm products are very broadly defined and include firearms, firearm 
parts, nonpowder firearms (e.g., air rifles and BB guns) and ammunition.73  Proposed 
regulations must be made final within 120 days and the Attorney General must 
consider petitions to issue, amend or repeal regulations.74
The Firearms Safety Act gives the Attorney General the authority to enforce the 
regulations.  The Attorney General may prohibit the manufacture, sale or transfer of 
a firearm product that has been manufactured, imported, transferred, or distributed in 
violation of a regulation.75  In addition, the Attorney General may order 
manufacturers and dealers to provide notice to the public, or to repair, replace, 
refund the purchase price, or otherwise recall a firearm product that the Attorney 
General finds poses an unreasonable risk of injury to the public, does not comply 
with a regulation, or is defective.76  The Attorney General is given the extraordinary 
authority to issue an order prohibiting the manufacture, importation, transfer, 
distribution or export of a firearm product “if the Attorney General determines that 
the exercise of other authority under this Act would not be sufficient to prevent the 
[firearm] product from posing an unreasonable risk of injury to the public.”77  The 
Attorney General has the authority to impose both civil and criminal penalties for 
violations of the Act or regulations, to seek injunctive enforcement of the Act, and to 
bring an action to restrain the distribution of “imminently hazardous firearms.”78
                                                                
69“Corzine, Kennedy Call for Gun Safety,” Press Release (June 10, 2003).  Website of the 
Honorable Jon Corzine at http://corzine.senate.gov. 
70For a discussion of the technical aspects of these safety features, supra note 19. 
71“Corzine, Kennedy Call for Gun Safety,” supra note 69. 
72S.1224, 108th Cong. § 101(a) (2003). 
73Id. at § 3(a)(3). 
74Id. at § 101(b). 
75Id. at  § 102(a). 
76 Id. at § 102(b). 
77 Id. at § 102(c). 
78Id. at §§ 301-303, 351. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
240 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:225 
Manufacturers of firearm products must test those products to determine whether 
they conform to the pertinent regulations, certify that conformity, and inform the 
Attorney General whenever they intend to manufacture a new “type” of firearm 
product.79  Firearm products must be accompanied by detailed labels.80  Commerce in 
firearm products that do not conform to regulations or are in violation of an Attorney 
General order is prohibited, as is stockpiling of firearm products in the interval 
between the time a regulation is promulgated, and the time that it takes effect.81   
The Firearms Safety Act creates a private action for damages for persons 
“aggrieved” by violations of the Act, or regulations or orders promulgated under it.82  
The Act also provides for private enforcement by any “interested person.”83  
Compliance with the Act or with regulations or orders promulgated under its 
authority is not a defense in an action brought under State law, and the failure of the 
Attorney General to take an action is not admissible in any civil action involving the 
liability of a firearms manufacturer or dealer.84   
There are, finally, a number of miscellaneous, but not unimportant sections of the 
Firearms Safety Act.  The Act has no preemptive effect and states and localities are 
free to maintain their own firearm safety laws and regulations, as long as they are 
more restrictive than those of the Attorney General.85  Agencies of states, their 
political subdivisions, the Federal Government itself, and officers and employees of 
those agencies acting in their official capacities are exempt from the prohibitions of 
the Act.86  Finally, the Attorney General must collect certain information about 
firearm-related deaths and injuries and about the firearms industry, make that 
information available, and make an annual report to Congress.87
IV.  COMPARING THE FIREARMS SAFETY ACT AND 
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 
A.  Justification 
This next section compares the sections of the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA 
that share common topics and issues.  Comparing the Firearms Safety Act to the 
CPSA as administered by the Commission is a useful exercise.88  The CPSA and its 
                                                                
79Id. at § 201(a) and (b). 
80Id. at § 201(c). 
81Id. at §§ 201(e)-(g). 
82Id. at § 304. 
83Id. at § 305. 
84Id. at  § 306. 
85Id. at § 502. 
86Id. at § 202. 
87S.1224, §§ 401 and 402. 
88There is no reason why one could not compare the Firearms Safety Act with the 
regulatory statutes and schemes for products such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals and 
pesticides, and perhaps such comparisons would be useful.  Nevertheless, most persons and 
groups favoring safety regulation of firearms compare firearms to products regulated by the 
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administration by the Commission have been generally supported for over thirty 
years by the public, Congress, the regulated community and the advocacy groups 
that are interested in and seek to influence Commission activities.  The Commission 
certainly has been criticized for doing too little to protect the consumer and too much 
to harass industry.89  But some objective evidence suggests that the Commission has 
done a reasonably good job of administering the CPSA to protect the public against 
the risks that Congress has instructed the Commission to address. 
The first piece of evidence is that Congress has not seen fit to change the CPSA 
since 1990.90  Congressional committees have held hearings on the reauthorization 
and oversight of the Commission91, but these hearings have resulted in movement of 
legislation in only one case:  S.1261, which the Senate passed on August 26, 2003.  
                                                          
Commission.  Consumer Federation of America, for example, mentions Federal safety 
regulations for refrigerators and freezers, cribs, children’s sleepwear, meat and poultry, and 
automobiles in endorsing the Firearms Safety and Consumer Protection Act.  Consumer Fed’n 
of Am., Health and Safety Standards for Everyday Products and Safety Standards That Could 
be Applied to Guns, available at http://www.consumerfed.org/products.pdf  The first four 
products mentioned are subject to regulations by the Commission.  Another organization, 
“Regulateguns.org” mentions that the Commission has the authority to regulate 15,000 
consumer products, but not firearms, at http://www.regulateguns.org/default.asp  By contrast, 
the Violence Policy Center has opposed Commission regulation or firearms in favor of safety 
regulation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives, but the basis for the 
opposition is the regulatory process which the Commission must use.  “The Treasury 
Department is Better Equipped than the Consumer Product Safety Commission to Regulate the 
Gun Industry” at http://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/treascp.htm  
89A criticism that the Commission is relatively ineffective to alleviate product hazards is 
contained in MARLA FELCHER, IT’S NO ACCIDENT, HOW CORPORATIONS SELL DANGEROUS 
PRODUCTS, 119-39, 154-199 (2001).  A criticism that the Commission harasses the regulated 
community is contained in THOMAS HOLT, THE RISE OF THE NANNY STATE, HOW CONSUMER 
ADVOCATES TRY TO RUN OUR LIVES, x-xiv, 54-55 (1995).   
90The last reauthorization of the Commission was the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-608, 104 Stat. 3110 (1990).  Subsequent 
legislation has imposed labeling requirements for toys, games, marbles and small balls. Child 
Safety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-267, 108 Stat. 722 (1994), 15 U.S.C. § 1278 (2000).  
This legislation was passed in response to the decision of the Commission not to proceed with 
rulemaking on this very subject, so it might be read as a congressional disagreement with the 
decision of the Commission.  There were, however, intervening events.  Connecticut passed its 
own labeling legislation and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld it against 
a challenge from the toy industry.  The toy industry supported the legislation because it feared 
inconsistent state requirements and had a special section inserted governing the preemptive 
effect of the legislation.  H.R. REP. NO. 103-500 at 10-11 (1994). 
91Consumer Product Safety Commission, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization: S. No. 104-570 
Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Committee 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1996).  Reauthorization of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission: H.R. No. 10554 Before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. 
(1997); Consumer Safety Initiatives: Protecting the Vulnerable: H. R. Rep.106-130 Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, Committee on 
Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000). 
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Aside from technical changes pertaining to titles of certain officers of the 
Commission and changes in the numbers of authorized employees and the 
authorization levels, the bill made only two changes.  It authorized the Commission 
itself to conduct the steps of a certain recalls if the company itself were financially 
unable to do so, and increased substantially the limits of civil penalties that the 
Commission is authorized to collect.92  Both of these changes could easily be read as 
votes of confidence in the Commission’s ability to conduct recalls and to fine 
companies that commit violations of the CPSA.  It is true that the money 
appropriated for the Commission has required the Commission to reduce the level of 
its staff by about ten percent since 1990.93  This diminution in staff levels, however, 
probably better reflects the priority of the Commission in the overall scheme of the 
federal government, and not specific dissatisfaction with the Commission or the 
statutes that it administers.   
In addition to general Congressional acceptance of the legitimacy of Commission 
operations, the Office of Management and Budget’s Performance Assessment Rating 
Tool awarded the Commission a relatively high (83 percent) assessment among the 
20 percent of Federal programs rated for fiscal year 2003.94  The Commission itself 
has described its own accomplishments,95 although those claims might be dismissed 
as self-serving.  It is, therefore, probably fair to compare the Commission’s statutory 
structure and authority with those of the Firearms Safety Act.   
A conclusion that the Commission has done a good job overall of regulating the 
safety of consumer products is, however, not necessarily an argument for subjecting 
firearms to safety regulation by the Commission.96  The historical retrospective in the 
preceding section has shown the political difficulties that such a grant of regulatory 
authority would face.  If those obstacles were somehow overcome, the Commission 
would still face a substantial number of technical difficulties in deciding whether, 
and to what extent, it should regulate firearms safety.  The simplest way of possibly 
subjecting firearms to federal safety regulation would be to repeal the existing 
exemption to the definition of “consumer product” in the CPSA.97  Such repeal 
would, in and of itself, not require the Commission to promulgate regulations, since 
there are many consumer products for which the Commission has no regulations, but 
over which, nevertheless, it does exercise jurisdiction.98  The Commission would 
                                                                
92S.1261 108th Cong. §§ 5 and 6, (2003). 
93U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 2005 Performance Budget, Feb. 2004, p. vi. 
94Id. at iv. 
95Id. at iv, v, xiv-xvii. 
96Some advocates of the Firearms Safety Act have argued specifically against subjecting 
firearms to the jurisdiction of the Commission.  See “The Treasury Department is Better 
Equipped than the Consumer Product Safety Commission to Regulate the Gun Industry,” 
Violence Policy Center Fact Sheet endorsing Firearms Safety and Consumer Protection Act, 
S.534 and H.R. 920 at http://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/trascp.htm. 
97An example of this approach was S.1190 106th Cong. (1999), introduced by Senator 
Jack Reed (D-R.I.).  The bill modified the definition of “consumer product” in the CPSA so 
that it would include firearms and ammunition. 
98The Commission estimates that there are approximately 15,000 products within its 
jurisdiction.  U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 2002 Annual Performance Report, p. 
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have to consider whether regulations on firearms were justified in light of the 
resources available to the Commission,99 the lives saved and injuries prevented that 
such regulations might achieve,100 the likelihood that the Commission could make 
the findings required by the CPSA or FHSA,101 and other priorities that the 
Commission has established or will establish.102  When readers examine the detailed 
findings that the Commission must make to justify regulations and recalls, they will 
gain an appreciation of the technical difficulty that the Commission would face in 
attempting to regulate firearms under the CPSA.   
                                                          
ii.  The Commission has regulations governing 283 products under all of the acts that it 
administers.  In addition to the CPSA and the FHSA, which have been previously mentioned, 
the Commission administers the Flammable Fabrics Act, Pub. L. No. 83-88, 67 Stat. 111 (June 
30, 1953), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (2000), the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, Pub. L. No. 
91-601, 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1476 (2000), the Refrigerator 
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 84-930, 70 Stat. 953 (Aug. 2, 1956) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1214 (2000)), 
and the Child Safety Protection Act, supra note 90. 
99The Commission Fiscal Year 2004 appropriation was $60 million, which funded 471 
full-time equivalent employees for the Commission.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 108-199, Div. G, Title III, “Consumer Product Safety Commission,” (Jan. 23, 2004).  
That amount, however, was subject to an across-the-board reduction of 0.59%, (U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations, “House Passes FY04 Consolidated 
Appropriations,”) leaving $59.6 million.  The request in the President’s Budget for the 
Commission for Fiscal Year 2005 is $62.7 million.  U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission 2005 Performance Budget, February 2004, p. ii. 
100According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 2000 a total of 28,663 persons 
died from firearms injuries in the United States.  Firearm accidents and firearm injuries of 
undetermined origin accounted for 776 and 230 of the deaths, respectively.  National Vital 
Statistics Report, Vol. 50, No. 15, September 16, 2002.  That same year, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control reported 
that there were an estimated 75,685 firearm gunshot injuries, of which 23,237 were deemed to 
be unintentional.  In 2002 those figures were 58,841 and 17,579 respectively.  
http://webappa.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe.  Not all of the deaths and injuries determined to 
have been associated with the accidental discharge or firearms would have been prevented by 
regulations.  For example, hunting accidents in which the shooter intended the discharge 
because he mistakenly believed to victim to be a game animal could not be prevented by 
regulations governing the weapon, since the shooter intended that it fire.  Seeking to determine 
whether lives would be saved and, if so, in what numbers, by any particular regulation or 
combination of regulations would be a major task confronting the Commission. 
101For a discussion of the findings that the Commission must make to support regulations, 
see infra notes 140 -156 and accompanying text. 
102The latest Strategic Plan of the Commission establishes results-oriented goals in three 
areas:  (1) reduce the rate of death from fire related causes by 20% from 1998 to 2013; (2) 
reduce the rate of death from carbon monoxide poisoning by 20% by 2013; and (3) reduce the 
rate of swimming pool and other at-home drownings of children under 5 by 10% by 2013.  
There are other service quality and customer satisfaction goals.  Strategic Plan, U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, September 2003, pp. 13, 21, 27, 35, and 39. 
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B.  Point by Point Comparison 
1.  Overview 
This section compares the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act on a number of key 
points: 
 
1. The official responsible for the interpretation and enforcement; 
2. The stated objectives; 
3. The procedures and findings required for rulemaking, with special 
attention to the role of voluntary standards and the preemptive effect of 
Federal regulations; 
4. The criteria of, procedures required and remedies available for recalls; 
5. Other remedies available to the respective enforcing officials; 
6. Information gathering and reporting requirements; 
7. Civil and criminal penalties; 
8. The applicability of laws, regulations and orders to government entities 
and government officials; 
9. Testing, certification, labeling, and prior notice; 
10. Disclosure of information to the public; 
11. Private enforcement and remedies; 
 
After describing the similarities and differences for each comparison, the article 
discusses the probable effect of and the possible motives that the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act had for differences.  Any discussion of motive naturally 
involves subjective evaluation.  Where the sponsors of the bill addressed a point in 
their statements in support of the legislation, the statement’s content is assumed to be 
the motive.  Silence on the part of the sponsors presents a problem.  For such 
differences the author assessed whether there could be any safety advantage in the 
provision and also whether and to what extent the provision could impede commerce 
in firearms.103  If there was no expressed or obvious safety advantage to the 
                                                                
103Neither Senator Corzine nor Representative Kennedy have been favorable to private 
firearms ownership.  For example, Senator Corzine introduced legislation that would deny the 
Department of Justice funds to advocate a view that the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, as opposed to a collective 
right.  Corzine Bill Would Disarm Gun Crusade: Prohibits Use of Taxpayer Dollars to 
Misrepresent Long-Settled Meaning of the Second Amendment, Press Release of the Hon. Jon 
Corzine, (Feb. 12, 2003) at http://corzine.senate.gov/press_office/ record.cfm?id=190296.  See 
also, Corzine Blasts Ashcroft For Overshooting on Right To Bear Arms, Press Release of the 
Hon. Jon Corzine, May 8, 2002, http://corzine.senate.gov’press_office/record.cfm?id=186701.  
In the case of Representative Kennedy, his website cites statistics purporting to establish that 
“[G]uns kept in the  home are 43 times more likely to kill a family member or friend than to 
kill in self-defense,” and “[T]he presence of a gun in the home triples the homicide in that 
home. . .”  Such rhetoric, aside from the logic problems (guns have no family members nor do 
inanimate objects defend themselves, and a phrase such as “triples the homicide in that home” 
makes no sense whatsoever), indicates that Representative Kennedy is no friend of private 
firearms ownership.  His website goes on to mention that, in addition to his sponsorship of the 
Firearms Safety Act, Representative Kennedy is a primary sponsor of The Gun Buyback 
Partnership Grant, H.R. 278, 107th Cong. (2001) and touts his participation in gun “buyback” 
programs.  Finally, Representative Kennedy’s website mentions in participation in the 
“Million Mom March,” and his co-sponsorship of legislation that he claims will strengthen 
enforcement of existing gun laws at http//:www.house.gov/patrickkennedy 
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provision, as measured by its similarity to the Consumer Product Safety Act, and if 
the effect of the provision could be a significant impediment to commerce in 
firearms, the author assumed that the latter effect was the motive of the sponsors.  If, 
of course, there are genuine safety advantages or other unidentified motives the 
sponsors or the supporters of this legislation are free to identify them.  A genuine 
debate on the best mechanism to increase public safety with firearms is always 
welcome. 
2.  The Responsible Official 
The Firearms Safety Act assigns the responsibility for firearms safety to the 
Attorney General.  The selection of the Attorney General as the person (and the 
Department of Justice as the institution) to both develop the regulations for and to 
enforce the Firearms Safety Act reflects an obvious policy choice on the part of the 
sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act, with significant policy implications.  The 
Commission is very different from an office such as that of the Attorney General.  
For one thing it is a Commission; a majority of Commissioners must agree in order 
for the Commission to take action.104  The necessity to obtain a majority provides 
some assurance that both regulatory and enforcement decisions will be thoroughly 
considered.  The Commission is also an independent regulatory Commission.105  
Although this status has been subject to different interpretations,106 it seems almost 
unquestionable that the Commission is subject to less direct political interference 
than is the office of the Attorney General.  The Attorney General may be removed 
from his office at will by the President.107  In the case of the Commission, however, 
                                                          
/issues/law_enforcement.html.  In light of such positions, this author has no reluctance to 
characterize either Senator Corzine or Representative Kennedy as hostile to private firearms 
ownership. 
104Section 4 (a) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2004) establishes the Commission as a 
five member Commission although it has been operating with only three members since the 
mid-1980s for budgetary reasons.  The Chairman of the Commission is the principal executive 
officer of the Commission and exercises all the executive and administrative functions of the 
Commission.  Even these functions are, however governed by general policies of the 
Commission.  CPSA § 4(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (f) (2000).  Commission regulations concerning 
meetings are set forth at 16 C.F.R. Part 1013 (2003), Commission regulations concerning 
adjudications are set forth at 16 C.F.R. Part 1025 (2003), Commission regulations concerning 
petitions are set forth at 16 C.F.R. Part 1051 (2003) and Commission regulations concerning 
oral presentations are set forth at 16 C.F.R. Part 1052 (2003). 
105Section 4 of the CPSA 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2004) creates the Commission as an 
independent regulatory Commission. 
106For discussions of how executive orders pertain to independent agencies, see Seven 
Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation 70 U. 
CHICAGO L. REV. 821 (2003); Robert Hahn & Cass Sunstein, A New Executive Order for 
Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1489 (2002). 
107U.S. Const. Art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint officers of the United States.  This 
authority has been construed to authorize the removal of such officers.  Bailey v. Richardson, 
182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 918, 918 (1950); Correa Velez v. DeJesus 
Schuf, 396 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 (D.P.R. 1975). 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
246 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:225 
only the Chairman may be removed by the President without cause from the office of 
Chairman.108  Commissioners serving their seven-year terms may only be removed 
by the President for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other 
cause.109  Moreover, in the case of the Commission, there is an explicitly partisan 
division within the Commission:  only three of its members may be affiliated with 
the same political party.110  All of these characteristics of the Commission serve to 
insulate it somewhat from partisan political pressures and help to ensure that 
regulations and enforcement decisions reflect a genuine desire to address a product 
safety problem.  Almost none of these constraints apply to the Attorney General.  
While these characteristics make it more likely that the Attorney General will be 
responsive to the will of the President, it is also likely that regulations and 
enforcement decisions made by the Attorney General will be less likely to reflect the 
competing points of view that are inherent in a multi-member body such as the 
Commission. 
The sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act probably assigned regulatory and 
enforcement responsibility to the Attorney General because the BATFE now resides 
within the Department of Justice.111  The BATFE has engaged in some degree of 
firearms regulation since the passage of the National Firearms Act,112 and has 
administered a system of review of imported handguns that includes some safety-
related components.113  Another reason for choosing the U.S. Attorney General may 
have been the example of the actions of state attorney generals in promulgating 
regulations governing the safety of the firearms.  The Attorney General in the State 
of Massachusetts promulgated such regulations under a general authority to protect 
consumers.114  There were subsequent legislative activities to codify the regulations 
                                                                
108Memorandum to Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation from 
Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public Law, American Law Division re:  Power of 
the President to Remove the Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2001.  (On file with the author) A Chairman 
removed from the office of Chairman may continue to serve as a Commissioner for the 
balance of his or her statutorily-determined term. 
109CPSA § 4 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2000). 
110CPSA § 4 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 2053(c) (2000).  Since the Commission has had only three 
commissioners since the mid-1980s, in practice this requirement has meant that only two 
commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party. 
111Versions of the bill in previous Congresses assigned the responsibility for 
administration and enforcement to the Department of the Treasury.  S.330 and H.R. 671, 
introduced in the 107th Congress by Senator Torricelli (D-NY) and Representative Kennedy 
(D-RI) and S.534 and H.R. 920, introduced in the 106th Congress by the same two members. 
112National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. at L. 1236, Chap. 757, June 26, 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5849 
(2004). 
113For a discussion of the safety implications of the “point system,” see supra notes 16 – 
24 and accompanying text. 
114In October 1997 the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts issued handgun 
safety regulations under the authority of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS Ch. 93A (essentially a deceptive practices act statute).  The authority and the 
specific regulations were challenged in court and their validity upheld.  The regulations are 
codified at 501 CMR Part 16. 
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of the Massachusetts Attorney General.115  The California Department of Justice also 
has regulations governing firearms that include some safety considerations.116  The 
final reason for assigning the responsibility for firearms safety regulation to the 
Attorney General is probably a general feeling that firearms regulation is a matter for 
the police, and the Attorney General clearly has a law enforcement role.117  The 
choice of the Attorney General as the responsible official by the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act probably indicates that they do not consider firearms safety an 
issue separate and apart from that of the criminal misuse of firearms.118   
3.  Objectives 
Most of the objectives of the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA are similar.  One 
objective appears in the Firearms Safety Act but not in the CPSA.  There is also a 
difference in an objective that appears in both the Firearms Safety Act and the 
CPSA.  These differences indicate the intent of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety 
Act to limit commerce in firearms.  The objectives of the CPSA are as follows:119
 
1. Protect the public against the unreasonable risk of injury associated with 
consumer products; 
2. Assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer 
products; 
3. Develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and minimize 
conflicting State and local regulations; and, 
4. Promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of 
product-related deaths, illnesses and injuries. 
 
The objectives of the Firearms Safety Act track these four CPSA objectives, but 
with one significant change and one significant addition.  The Firearms Safety Act 
states as among its objectives:120
 
                                                                
115Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 140.  The Attorney General regulations include three product 
requirements not contained in the laws:  child-safety features, loaded chamber indicators and 
magazine safety disconnects for self-loading handguns, and tamper-resistant serial numbers.  
940 CMR 16.03 and 16.05(2)-(4). 
116CAL. CODE REGS. title 11, § 968.43 (2004). 
117Several of the alleged “defects” of firearms cited in the press release announcing the 
introduction of the legislation (e.g., easy concealability, greater magazine capacity, and more 
powerful ammunition) were so labeled because they “make firearms more likely to be used in 
crimes and more deadly if they are.”  “Corzine, Kennedy Call For Gun Safety,” supra.  If 
reducing crime is one of the objectives of the Firearms Safety Act, assigning the responsibility 
for enforcement to the Attorney General is logical. 
118Senator Corzine’s press release announcing the introduction of the Firearms Safety Act 
states that “In recent years, firearm manufacturers have taken a number of steps to make 
firearms more likely to be used in crimes, and more deadly if they are.  Many guns are being 
produced to be easily concealable, to fire more rounds without reloading and to fire larger, 
more lethal ammunition.”  “Corzine, Kennedy Call For Gun Safety,” supra.  
119CPSA § 2 (b)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. §2051(b)(1)-(4) (2000). 
120S.1224, § 2(1)-(5). 
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1. Protect the public against the unreasonable risk of death and injury 
associated with firearms and related products; 
2. Develop safety standards for firearms and related products; 
3. Assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of firearms and 
related products; 
4. Promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of 
firearm-related deaths and injuries; and 
5. Restrict the availability of weapons that pose an unreasonable risk of 
death or injury. 
 
Objective number two differs significantly from its counterpart in the CPSA.  
The CPSA objective states not only that the Commission should develop safety 
standards for consumer products, but that it should seek to minimize conflicting state 
and local regulations.  The Firearms Safety Act has no similar objective and, as will 
be seen when the preemption sections of the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act are 
compared,121 it explicitly does not limit the effect of State and local firearms safety 
regulation, as long as such regulation is more stringent than the regulations 
developed under the Firearms Safety Act.  Another objective appears in the Firearms 
Safety Act that is absent from the CPSA:  restricting the availability of weapons that 
pose an unreasonable risk of death and injury.122  While the provisions of the CPSA 
and the powers available to the Commission certainly imply that it will have the 
effect of restricting the availability of consumer products that pose an unreasonable 
risk of death or injury, it is significant that Congress did not state such an objective 
in the original authorizing legislation, nor has it seen fit to amend the CPSA to state 
such an objective in the over thirty years in which the Commission has operated.  
The decision of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act to confer no preemptive 
effect for the Attorney General’s safety regulations, and to state an express objective 
of limiting commerce in firearms, demonstrates a probable objective beyond mere 
safety:  limiting commerce in firearms. 
4.  Rulemaking 
Central to the authority granted to the Commission by the CPSA and to the 
Attorney General by the Firearms Safety Act is the authority to promulgate 
enforceable rules governing the products within their respective jurisdiction.  But 
there the similarities largely end.  The Commission’s authority, while considerable, 
is constrained by the form that regulations may take, by the procedures that the 
Commission must follow, and by the findings that the Commission must make in 
order to support regulations.  By contrast, the authority granted to the Attorney 
General by the Firearms Safety Act is very wide and its exercise is not subject to any 
specific procedures.  It requires no specific findings.  The lack of any regulatory 
process similar to that of the CPSA indicates again the probable intent of the 
sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act that its authority be used wherever possible to 
restrict commerce in firearms. 
                                                                
121See infra notes 172 – 179 and accompanying text. 
122S.1224, § 2(5). 
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a.  Necessity to Promulgate Regulations 
One major difference between the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act is 
immediately apparent:  the Attorney General must promulgate regulations governing 
firearms safety,123 while the Commission may promulgate consumer product safety 
standards.124  Since the Commission has an estimated 15,000 products under its 
jurisdiction,125 it would obviously be extraordinarily difficult for it to promulgate 
regulations for even a small fraction of those products.  The fact that the Commission 
has jurisdiction over so many products is among the reasons that the Commission has 
set priorities126 and established procedures for deciding upon which products it 
should focus in its rulemaking and enforcement activities.127  No such dilemmas 
confront the Attorney General, at least in theory.  The Firearms Safety Act requires 
safety rules for all firearms and firearm products and these regulations must cover the 
design, manufacture and performance of firearms and firearm products.128  Although 
the Firearms Safety Act does not specify the priorities for rulemaking, presumably 
the Attorney General would focus rulemaking efforts on those firearm and firearm 
products that the Attorney General believed posed the greatest hazards to 
consumers.129  In any event, given the wide variety of firearms, ammunition, 
associated products, and the variations in commerce in all of them, the Attorney 
General will have a full program of regulation to undertake in the event that some 
version of the Firearms Safety Act becomes law.  The fact that the Firearms Safety 
                                                                
123S.1224, § 101(a). 
124CPSA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. §2056(a). 
125U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 2002 Annual Performance Report p. ii. 
126See supra note 102, for a discussion of the strategic goals that the Commission has set 
in its Fiscal Year 2004 Strategic Plan. 
127The Commission’s policy on establishing priorities for Commission action is set forth in 
16 CFR § 1009.8 (2003).  The seven criteria cited in the regulation are:  frequency and 
severity of injuries, causality of injuries, chronic illness and future injuries, cost and benefit of 
Commission action, unforeseen nature of the risk, vulnerability of the population at risk, and 
probability of exposure to the hazard. 
128Firearm not only means the normal sense of the word as a device that uses the 
combustion of a chemical propellant to impart velocity to a projectile, but also air rifles 
S.1224, § 3(a)(7).  The term “nonpowder firearm” is an oxymoron, since a firearm uses 
combustion to initiate the flight of a ballistic missile.  SAAMI glossary of firearms terms at 
www.saami.org.  “Firearm product” includes not only firearms, but also firearm parts, 
ammunition, and locking devices designed to prevent the accidental discharge of a firearm.  
S.1224, § 3(a)(2), (3).  S.1224 would clearly subject air rifles and firearm locking devices to 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and probably remove those items from the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. 
129Handguns are generally regarded as posing the greatest safety risk, since they are easier 
to point and more commonly left loaded because of their intended use of self-defense.  The 
examples of safety features cited by the sponsors of S.1224 (e.g., magazine disconnectors or 
safeties and loaded chamber indicators) are much more common features of handguns than of 
rifles or shotguns.  Other characteristics cited in the press release (concealability, large 
magazine capacity and greater power) are also related more to handguns than to rifles and 
shotguns.  “Corzine, Kennedy Call for Gun Safety, supra.     
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Act requires regulations for firearms, while the CPSA has been in force for over 
thirty years with no requirement for regulations for consumer products130 is another 
example that the probable intent of the sponsors is to limit commerce in firearms 
under the pretense of safety. 
b.  Form of the Regulations 
Regulations for consumer products promulgated by the Commission must be in 
the form of a performance standard, in the form of warnings and instructions, or 
some combination of these.131  By implication, therefore, the Commission may not 
promulgate a consumer product safety that contains design or material requirements; 
the regulation must consist of a test that the consumer product must pass, possibly 
coupled with warnings and instructions on the product’s label or packaging inserts, 
or possibly on the product itself.  This requirement represents a change from the 
original CPSA and reflects Congress’s desire that the Commission not be too 
prescriptive in its consumer product safety regulations.132
That provision of the CPSA contrasts dramatically with the requirement of the 
Firearms Safety Act that the Attorney General prescribe regulations not only for the 
performance of firearms, but also for their design and manufacture, and for 
commerce in firearms.133  The Attorney General would become a virtual “firearms 
czar,” able to specify every aspect of how firearms are designed and manufactured, 
how they perform and where and how they are sold.  In light of the fact that the 
Commission has operated for over twenty years with a requirement that it limit itself 
to specifying consumer product performance in safety regulations, the delegation of 
such broad power over firearms to the Attorney General indicates yet again the intent 
of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act that that power be used to limit commerce 
in firearms to the greatest extent possible. 
                                                                
130Over the course of the existence of the Commission, Congress has acted occasionally to 
require regulations for or to ban outright certain products:  butyl nitrate (Pub. L. 100-690, § 
2404, Nov. 18, 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 2057(a) (2000)), isopropal nitrates and other nitrates (Pub. 
L. 101-647, Tit. XXIII, § 3202 Nov 29, 1990, 15 U.S.C. § 2057(b) (2000)), walk-behind 
power lawn mowers (Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1212, 95 Stat. 724 (1981), lawn darts (Pub. L. 100-
613, 102 Stat. 3183 (1988)), automatic garage door openers (Pub. L. 101-608, § 203, 104 Stat. 
3110 (1990), 15 U.S.C. § 2056), bicycle helmets (Pub. L. 103-267, § 205, 108 Stat.722 (1994), 
15 U.S.C. § 6004), and lead-lined water coolers (Pub. L. 100-572, § 1462, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-22 
(2000)).  Given the vast number of products within the Commission’s jurisdiction, this 
represents a surprisingly small number of products for which Congress has decided that there 
must be regulations.  There has also been proposed legislation to require additional mandatory 
product safety regulations for infants and toddlers products, but such legislation has yet to 
have even been the subject of a hearing.  “Infant and Toddler Durable Product Safety Act,” 
H.R. 2911, 108th Cong. (2003). 
131CPSA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a). 
132Congress removed the Commission’s option to specify design requirements by the 
passage of the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, title XII, 
Subtitle A, 95 Stat. 703 (1981). 
133S.1224, § 101(a). 
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c.  Procedure to Promulgate and Findings Required to Support Regulations 
The intent of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act to grant the maximum 
authority possible to the Attorney General becomes starkly apparent in examining 
the Act’s regulatory procedures and required findings. The Firearms Safety Act 
specifies no procedure for the Attorney General to follow to issue regulations under 
its authority.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)134 would, by the terms of the 
APA, require rulemaking carried out under the authority of the Firearms Safety Act 
to be conducted under the APA’s general notice and comment procedure.135  Judicial 
review of the Attorney General’s firearms regulations would be under the “arbitrary, 
capricious and abuse of discretion” standard.136  The only findings that the Attorney 
General must make to support the regulations that are issued are that they are 
reasonably necessary to reduce or prevent unreasonable risk of injury resulting from 
the use of firearms and firearm products.137  The fact that only 120 days may elapse 
between the time that the Attorney General proposes regulations under the Firearms 
Safety Act and the time that they must be issued in final form138 indicates that almost 
all of the work in developing a regulation will have to be done before the public is 
informed of what the proposed regulations will say.139
In contrast to the very basic procedures required for rulemaking implied by the 
Firearms Safety Act, the procedures required by the CPSA to promulgate a consumer 
product standard and the findings necessary to support that standard are more 
complicated and more detailed.  The Commission commences rulemaking under the 
CPSA with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) which must:140
 
                                                                
134Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. § 89 332, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), amended by 80 
Stat. 378 (1966), 81 Stat. 54 (1967), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).  
135Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. §553 (2000).  The constitutional 
requirement that no person be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law 
(U.S. Const. Amend. V) would also require regular procedures for rulemaking, but they would 
not exceed those required by the Administrative Procedures Act.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 
F.2d 298, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  The Firearms Safety Act would also be subject to some 
government-wide statutory and executive order requirements for rulemaking.  See infra notes  
152 and 153 and accompanying text. 
136Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2000). 
137S.1224 § 101(a). 
138S.1224 § 101(b). 
139By contrast, approximately twenty months elapsed between the time that the 
Commission first proposed regulations for dive sticks and the time that those regulations were 
issued in final form.  66 Fed. Reg. 13645-13652, (March 7, 2001).  In the case of infant 
beanbag cushions, the time elapsed was also twenty months.  57 Fed. Reg. 27912-27916 (June 
23, 1992).  Both of these were relatively simple products and the rulemakings were relatively 
straightforward.  Rulemaking for complex hazards may take a great deal of time.  For 
example, the Commission commenced rulemaking on the hazard of small open-flame ignition 
of upholstered furniture in 1994.  After approximately nine years of work on the subject the 
Commission voted to reissue its advance notice of proposed rulemaking to include the hazard 
of smoldering (cigarette) ignition of upholstered furniture.  68 Fed. Reg. 60629, 60629-32 
(Oct. 23, 2003). 
140CPSA § 9(a)(1)-(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(1)-(6) (2000). 
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1. Identify the product and the nature of the risk associated with the product; 
2. Include a summary of each of the regulatory alternatives that the 
Commission is considering, including voluntary standards;141
3. Include relevant existing standards and the reasons why the Commission 
believes that they may not eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of 
injury; 
4. Invite the submission of comments concerning the risk of injury, the 
regulatory alternatives being considered and other possible alternatives for 
addressing the risk; 
5. Invite the submission of an existing standard or portion of a standard as a 
proposed mandatory standard; and 
6. Invite the submission of an intention and plan to develop a voluntary 
standard to address the risk of injury. 
 
When the Commission moves beyond the stage of the ANPR, it continues 
rulemaking by the preparation of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR).142  The 
findings required by an NPR are so specific and detailed that they are referred to as a 
preliminary regulatory analysis:143
 
1. A preliminary description of the potential costs and benefits of the 
proposed rule, including costs and benefits difficult to quantify monetarily 
and who would likely receive the benefits and who would likely bear the 
costs144; 
                                                                
141For a discussion of the Commission’s consideration of voluntary standards, see infra 
notes  167 – 169 and accompanying text. 
142CPSA § 9(c), 15 U.S.C. §2058(c). 
143CPSA § 9(c)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. §2058(c)(1)-(4) (2000). 
144The Commission’s economic staff generally follows the procedures laid out in Office of 
Management and Budget Circular No. A-4 (“Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003) 
when conducting cost-benefit analysis.  (Circular A-4 is a 48 page document, so the discussion 
that follows is obviously only a summary.)  (The Commission staff is not required to follow 
these procedures, since Executive Order 12866 explicitly exempts independent regulatory 
commissions such as the Commission from its requirements, one of which is Circular No. A-4.  
Insofar, however, as Circular No. A-4 reflects basic principles of economic analysis, the 
Commission staff usually chooses to follow it.)  Commission staff usually begins the technical 
part of a cost-benefit analysis by estimating a baseline annual risk for the product being 
regulated.  This baseline risk represents the risk before any regulation is developed and 
provides a reference point for comparisons with regulatory alternatives.  Estimating this 
baseline annual risk requires information on the number of product-related injuries and deaths 
and estimates of the number of products in use.  Information on injuries and deaths is usually 
provided by the Commission’s Directorate for Epidemiology.  Estimates of the number of 
products in use are sometimes available from published government data or trade sources, or 
the Commission may use its own Product Population Model to estimate the number of 
products in use.  The baseline annual risk is then monetized to estimate the annual societal 
costs associated with the risk.  The costs of nonfatal injuries are based on the Commission’s 
Injury Cost Model.  The costs of fatal injuries are based on estimates of the economic value of 
a statistical life from the economic literature.  The monetized values of the nonfatal and fatal 
injury costs are combined to produce an overall monetized estimate of the risks involving the 
use of the product under consideration.  These annual costs are aggregated over the years the 
product in question is expected to remain in use.  The costs accruing in future years are 
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2. A discussion of why a standard submitted to the Commission in response 
to the ANPR was not published in whole or in part as the proposed rule; 
3. A discussion of why the Commission believes that a voluntary standard 
will not, within a reasonable time, eliminate or adequately reduce the risk 
of injury; and 
4. A description of reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule, with a cost 
benefit analysis of each alternative, and an explanation of why the 
alternatives should not be published as a proposed rule. 
 
The Commission must make even more findings and conduct even more analyses 
before it may promulgate a final rule.  It must consider “relevant available product 
data, including the results of research, development, testing and investigation 
activities.”145  It must also consider and make findings concerning the following:146
 
1. The degree and nature of the risk of injury the rule seeks to eliminate or to 
reduce; 
2. The approximate number of consumer products or types or classes of 
consumer products to be covered by the rule; 
3. Why the public needs the consumer products covered by the rule and the 
probable effect that the rule will have on the utility, cost or availability of 
those consumer products; and 
4. How to achieve the rule’s147 objective while minimizing adverse effects 
on competition, and also minimizing the disruption or dislocation of 
manufacturing and other commercial practices consistent with safety. 
 
But the Commission’s task is still not finished.  It must take the findings that 
have just been described immediately above and prepare a final regulatory analysis, 
putting the factors considered in the preliminary regulatory analysis in final form.148  
                                                          
discounted to reflect the time preferences of society (usually a discount rate of both three and 
seven percent).  The aggregate present value of the societal costs is often calculated on a “per 
product in use” basis.  This value represents the maximum per unit benefit of a regulation if 
the regulation were 100% effective in preventing injuries and deaths addressed by the 
regulation.  The actual benefit depends upon the effectiveness of the regulation in reducing the 
baseline risks.  The Commission staff then considers how much the regulation would cost and 
how effective it would be in reducing the baseline risk.  The staff may conduct an analysis of 
how the product would have to be changed to meet the regulatory requirements and then 
estimate the costs of the engineering changes.  The staff may derive an estimate based on 
discussions with industry or engineering experts.  Once the costs are estimated, they can be 
compared directly to the expected benefit in the cost benefit analysis.  The staff usually 
evaluates several alternatives for each regulation and recommends the alternative that 
maximizes net benefits.  The cost-benefit analysis includes a sensitivity analysis that shows 
how the results change if different assumptions were used.  No two Commission cost-benefit 
analyses are the same, and there are some data that are difficult to find or to estimate. 
145CPSA § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. §2058(e). 
146CPSA § 9(f)(1)(A)-(D), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(1)(A)-(D)(2000). 
147CPSA § 9(f)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(1)(D)(2000) uses the term “order,” but in the 
context of the subsection it is clear that the requirement applies to the consumer product safety 
rule being promulgated. 
148CPSA § 9(f)(2)(A)-(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(2)(A)-(C)(2000).  For a recitation of the 
factors of a preliminary regulatory analysis, see supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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The Commission must also make the following findings and include them in the 
rule:149  
 
1. The rule is reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable 
risk of injury associated with the consumer product subject to the rule; 
2. The rule is in the public interest; 
3. If the rule creates a banned hazardous product,150 why no feasible safety 
standard would protect the public adequately; 
4. If there is a voluntary standard covering the risk of injury covered by the 
mandatory standard, compliance with the voluntary standard would not be 
likely to eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of injury, or it is unlikely 
that there will be substantial compliance with the voluntary standard;151
5. The benefits of the rule bear a reasonable relationship to its costs; and, 
6. The rule imposes the least burdensome requirement which prevents or 
adequately reduces the risk of injury that the rule is designed to address. 
 
In addition to these requirements of the CPSA, the Commission is subject to 
some government-wide requirements relating to the effect that a rule will have on 
small business entities and on other government entities,152 and to other government-
wide statutory rulemaking requirements.153  The Commission must find that it is in 
the public interest for the effective date of the rule to be greater than 180 days or less 
than 30 days after promulgation,154 and it may limit stockpiling.155  Product safety 
                                                                
149CPSA § 9(f)(3)(A)-(F), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(3)(A)-(F)(2000). 
150The Commission may declare a product to be a banned hazardous product if it finds that 
no feasible consumer product safety standard would protect the public from the unreasonable 
risk of injury associated with the use of the product.  CPSA § 8,  15 U.S.C. § 2057 (2000). 
151The requirement to defer to voluntary standards is one of the most central features of 
rulemaking under the CPSA.  For a discussion of the circumstances under which the 
Commission must defer to voluntary standards, see infra notes 167 – 169, and accompanying 
text. 
152Section 602 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. § 602) requires all Federal 
agencies to publish a regulatory agenda in the Federal Register two times a year, and to 
consider in their rulemakings the effect that the rules will have on small businesses and on 
other governmental entities.  Additionally, Executive Order 12866, issued on September 30, 
1993, requires all agencies, including independent agencies such as the Commission, to 
publish an agenda of regulatory actions expected to be under development or review by the 
agency during the next twelve months.   
153If the Commission is promulgating a “major rule” within the meaning of Congressional 
Review Act, Pub. L. 104-121, Tit. II, § 251, March 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 868, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-
808 (2000), which is defined has having an overall annual impact on the economy of $100 
million or more, the Commission must obtain OMB’s concurrence on whether it is a major 
rule, and it must then transmit the rule to the General Accounting Office for its review and 
possible repeal by Congress.  To date, the Commission has promulgated no such rule, but the 
pending rulemaking pertaining to the flammability of upholstered furniture will probably meet 
that criteria.  The Commission is also subject to the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1990), but has made a general finding that consumer 
product safety rules have no significant environmental impacts.  16 CFR Part 1021 (2003).  
154CPSA § 9(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(g)(1)(2000). 
155CPSA § 9(g)(2),  15 U.S.C. § 2058(g)(2)(2000). 
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rules are subject to judicial review by a Court of Appeals and may involve additional 
data, views and arguments presented to the Commission.  To sustain the rule, the 
reviewing court must make an affirmative determination that the Commission’s 
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole.156
The contrast between the simple procedure and very elementary findings that the 
Firearms Safety Act requires and the elaborate procedures and detailed findings 
required by the CPSA could hardly be more dramatic.  The contrast is even more 
compelling, moreover, because of the fact that the Firearms Safety Act requires 
rulemaking on a technically complex product where the social costs and benefits are 
controversial.157  The failure of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act to use even 
some of the procedures that the Commission has used with reasonable success for at 
least twenty years, demonstrates that the intent of the bill lies more in the 
suppression of commerce in firearms than in making firearms safer. 
The Firearms Safety Act contains one truly extraordinary grant of authority to the 
Attorney General.  Section 102(c) of the Firearms Safety Act authorizes the Attorney 
General to prohibit the manufacture, importation, transfer, distribution or export158 of 
a firearm product by order if the Attorney General determines that “the exercise of 
other authority under this Act would not be sufficient to prevent the product from 
posing an unreasonable risk of injury to the public.”  This section is unusual on a 
number of grounds.  First, it appears in the same section of the Firearms Safety Act 
as does the Attorney General’s authority to order recalls and not in the rulemaking 
section.159  It is not, therefore, clear whether the Attorney General is required to 
follow any rulemaking procedures whatsoever before exercising this authority.  If 
rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act are not required by 
this section, it is easy to imagine the Attorney General using it to circumvent the 
necessity of determining that the order was “reasonably necessary,” which is the 
other part of the findings required for rulemaking by the Firearms Safety Act.160  
                                                                
156CPSA § 11(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a)-(c)(2000). 
157JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS 97-116 (2d ed. 2000). Mr. Lott estimates the savings in lives and injuries from 
laws permitting the lawful carry of concealed handguns.  See also Joyce Lee Malcolm, Gun 
Control’s Twisted Outcome, REASON, Nov. 2002 at 20, 20-25. 
158How the export of a firearm from the U.S. could constitute a threat to the safety of 
firearms’ users within the U.S. is not a subject that the proponents of S.1224 have chosen to 
explain.  Section 18(a) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a)(2000) provides explicitly that it does 
not apply to exports unless the Commission makes an affirmative finding that the product is in 
fact distributed in the U.S., or that even its export presents an unreasonable risk of injury to 
consumer within the U.S., A grant of authority over exports is, of course, entirely consistent 
with a goal of S.1224 to hand as much authority as possible over firearms to the Attorney 
General. 
159The recall provisions of the Firearms Safety Act appear in S.1224 §102(a), (b), and are 
discussed in greater detail infra notes 186 – 188 and accompanying text. 
160S.1224, § 101(a).  Examples of the situations under which advocates of the bill believe 
that the authority might be exercised are “trigger activators that allow semi-automatic firearms 
to mimic the fully automatic fire of a machine gun,” and “specific firearms proven to be 
disproportionately associated with homicide, suicide or involved in unintentional injuries.”  
Consumer Federation of America, Health and Safety Standards for Everyday Products and 
Safety Standards That Could be Applied to Guns (June 10, 2003) available at 
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Second, there is nothing resembling this authority in the CPSA or in any of the other 
acts administered by the Commission.  The exercise of such largely standardless 
authority, especially in the absence of any type of notice and comment rulemaking, 
would probably test the limits of the Constitutional right to due process of law.161  It 
would also test the limits of Congress’s ability to delegate its authority to regulate 
interstate commerce to an administrative agency.162  Finally, the section grants 
affirmative authority by virtue of its implied or express absence in other parts of a 
statute, standing on its head the normal rule that a delegation of authority, even 
though it may be implicit, must still be tied to some affirmative grant of authority.163  
All of these observations support further the premise that the objective of the 
Firearms Safety Act is not safety, but rather the granting to an executive branch 
official of the maximum authority possible to regulate the firearms industry and 
suppress commerce in firearms. 
d.  Deferral to Voluntary Standards 
Yet another stark contrast between the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA is their 
respective treatment of voluntary standards.164  The approach taken by the Firearms 
Safety Act is simple:  the Attorney General is to promulgate mandatory regulations165 
and there is to be no deferral to voluntary standards.  Presumably the Attorney 
General could consider the existence and content of voluntary standards in deciding 
the content of mandatory standards, but there is certainly no requirement to do so.   
                                                          
http://www.consumerfed.org/products.pdf.  Since homicide and suicide are volitional acts 
having little or nothing to do with the safety of a firearm the prohibitive intent of this section is 
clear, at least as evidenced by the statements of some of its advocates. 
161Depending on the nature of the order issued by the Attorney General under the authority 
of this section, it might violate the Constitutional prohibition against deprivation of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law, U.S. CONST., amend. V or against a bill of attainder or 
ex post facto law U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
162See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), in which the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional a delegation of authority to the President to prohibit the transportation of 
oil produced in excess of the amount permitted by State laws or regulations, and, A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) which held unconstitutional a 
delegation of authority to the President to approve codes of fair competition.  The rationale of 
both these cases has been called into doubt, United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 
1988), but they remain good law.  A challenge to an order issued by the Attorney General 
under the authority of this section would be especially interesting because it concerns a 
product (“arms”) given special mention by the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
163The normal rule of delegation of authority to administrative agencies is that it must be 
expressed or implied by positive law.  J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION §§ 65:1-2 (3d ed. 2001).  In a delegation of administrative authority the 
legislature must define:  (1) what is to be done; (2) the instrumentality which is to accomplish 
it; and (3) the scope of the instrumentality’s authority by prescribing reasonable administrative 
standards.  Id. § 4:2.  Section 102(c) of the Firearms Safety Act contains very little resembling 
reasonable administrative standards to guide the Attorney General. 
164The term “voluntary standard” is somewhat ambiguous.  For a discussion of what it 
means in the context of the CPSA and FHSA, see infra note167 and accompanying text. 
165S.1224, § 101(a). 
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As noted in the previous section,166 the Commission is required at numerous 
points in the rulemaking process to conduct analyses and make findings about the 
existence and effectiveness of voluntary standards.167  When the Commission finds 
that there is a voluntary standard that would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk 
of injury, and if the Commission finds that it is likely that there will be substantial 
compliance with the voluntary standard, the Commission is legally disabled from 
promulgating its own mandatory standard.168  The Commission may not promulgate 
a mandatory standard if it makes those findings, even if there was no voluntary 
standard when the Commission began its own rulemaking.  The prohibition against 
mandatory standards also applies even if the voluntary standard to which the 
Commission defers was developed and adopted in response to the Commission’s 
own rulemaking, a not uncommon occurrence.  The requirement that the 
Commission defer to standards developed by private standards setting organizations 
has the effect of giving the private sector the ability to pre-empt Commission 
mandatory regulation by responding to a problem itself.169
                                                                
166See supra notes 140-156 and accompanying text. 
167The term “voluntary standard” is not defined by either the CPSA or the FHSA.  CPSA 
§ 9(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(b)(2) (2000), in defining the effective date of a voluntary 
standard, refers to final approval of the organization or other person which developed the 
standard.  In practice, voluntary standards mean standards set by private standards-setting 
organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ASTM International 
(formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials) and Underwriters Laboratories 
(UL).  These organizations operate largely through a consensus process in which Commission 
staff participate as non-voting members of various committees and subcommittees when 
safety is involved.  The standards-setting process is very competitive and U.S. standards-
setting organizations compete vigorously with their European counterparts. 
168CPSA § 7(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(1) (2000).  The subject of when a voluntary 
standard would eliminate or adequately reduce the risk of an injury addressed by the standard, 
and when it was likely that there would be substantial compliance with a voluntary standard 
was discussed in greatest detail in connection with the Commission’s adoption of voluntary 
standards covering bunk beds.  Memorandum dated December 16, 1998 from Commission 
General Counsel Jeffrey S. Bromme re: Bunk Beds—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—Legal 
Memorandum, pp. 3-5, 13-23.  Statements of the Honorable Thomas H. Moore and Mary 
Sheila Gall dated December 2, 1999 on publication of a final rule addressing entrapment of 
children in bunk beds.  
169The ability of private standards setting bodies to react to Commission rulemaking was 
shown best in the examples of chain saws, all-terrain vehicles and baby walkers.  In all three 
cases the Commission began rulemaking but terminated it after the Commission found that the 
voluntary standards would be adequate to adequately reduce the risk of injury and that there 
would be substantial compliance with the voluntary standards.  For baby walkers, see 67 Fed. 
Reg. 31165, 31165-66 (2002); for ATVs, see 56 Fed. Reg. 47166, 47168-70 (1991); and for 
chain saws, see 50 Fed. Reg. 35241, 35241-35243 (1985).  Another case in which the industry 
has clearly responded to Commission rulemaking is the safety regulation of infant cribs.  The 
Commission published an ANPR on December 16, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 65996 (1996), that 
specified performance tests designed to assure that crib slats would not disengage from the 
side panels.  The industry responded by developing a voluntary standard concerning that risk 
(“Specification for Full Size Baby Cribs (ASTM F1169-99)).  At the present time the 
Commission staff is monitoring the adequacy of and conformance with that voluntary standard 
before making further recommendations concerning the pending rulemaking.  Yet another 
example is the issue of baby bath seats.  The Commission published an ANPR on October 1, 
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The fact that the Firearms Safety Act contains no requirement that the Attorney 
General defer to voluntary standards developed by private standards setting 
organizations is especially significant since a well-developed body of voluntary 
standards and a system for considering changes to those standards already exist.  As 
mentioned earlier,170 SAAMI, has developed a large body of voluntary standards and 
a system accredited by ANSI for considering and making changes to those voluntary 
standards.  According to both SAAMI and ANSI policy, every five years the SAAMI 
standards must be revised or reaffirmed through a canvassing process that includes 
government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. 
Customs Service, non-SAAMI member companies and interested parties, such as the 
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology.  Changes to standards must 
also be made by the same canvass process.  The U.S. military, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and many other state and local agencies frequently require that their 
suppliers manufacture to SAAMI specifications.171  The fact that the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act required the Attorney General to promulgate mandatory 
standards, rather than incorporating the system of consideration of and deferral to 
voluntary standards used by the Commission successfully for over twenty years, 
demonstrates again that the real intention of the Firearms Safety Act is not firearm 
safety, but handing virtually plenary power over the firearms industry to an 
Executive Branch official. 
e.  Preemption of State and Local Regulations 
Yet another demonstration of the intent of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety 
Act that it be used as much as possible to harass and cripple the firearms industry lies 
in the fact that it does nothing to minimize state and local firearms safety regulation 
that might conflict with regulations issued under the Firearms Safety Act, or with 
each other.  The Firearms Safety Act provides that it has no preemptive effect for 
any state or local law, unless the state or local law is inconsistent with any provision 
of the Firearms Safety Act.172  The Firearms Safety Act, however, goes on to state 
that a state or local law is not inconsistent if it is of greater scope or imposes a 
                                                          
2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 39692 (2001), that specified performance tests designed to reduce the 
possibility that an infant would drown while being bathed in such a device.  The Commission 
followed that decision with a subsequent decision on December 29, 2003 to publish an NPR 
specifying a rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 74878 (2003).  The industry responded by developing a 
voluntary standard (ASTM F 1967-04).  The Commission is presently evaluating whether and 
to what extent it may defer to that voluntary standard, or whether it should promulgate a 
mandatory standard. 
170See supra note 10, 11 accompanying text, for a discussion of the background for the 
creation of SAAMI. 
171Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, Inc., official website of 
Sporting Arms & Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, at http://www.saami.org (last 
modified Sept. 30, 2004). 
172S.1224 § 502(a).  The section is oddly worded in that it refers to “conduct” with respect 
to a firearms product.  Many state and even federal laws make conduct with a firearm 
criminal, regardless of whether the firearm involved is “safe” or not.  One wonders whether 
the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act intended to confer such wide powers on the Attorney 
General that the regulations would cover many common criminal acts (e.g., robbery, 
aggravated assault) that often involve firearms. 
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penalty of greater severity than the prohibitions or penalties imposed by the Act.173  
The effect of this lack of preemption is obvious.  Not only will the firearms industry 
find itself subject to plenary control by the Federal Attorney General, it will also find 
itself subject to state legislatures, state administrative agencies, and local 
governments imposing more stringent requirements.  The firearms industry 
potentially gets the worst of both worlds: one Federal “gorilla” imposing a 
nationwide set of requirements, and dozens of State “monkeys” all imposing their 
own inconsistent requirements.174
The contrast between the approach taken by the Firearms Safety Act and the 
CPSA to preemption is dramatic.  As mentioned earlier, minimizing the possibility 
of conflict between state and local safety regulations for consumer products was one 
of the reasons that Congress gave for passing the CPSA.175  A mandatory consumer 
product safety standard explicitly preempts any inconsistent state or local laws or 
regulations that deal with the same risk of injury.176  There are two exceptions, but 
they are limited in scope.  A state or local government may set safety standards that 
result in a higher level of protection from a risk of injury when the consumer product 
in question is for the use of that government itself.177  For example, a state 
government might prescribe a different standard for walk-behind lawn mowers when 
state employees will be using the mowers to cut the grass.  The second exception 
requires a state or local government to apply to the Commission itself for a rule 
allowing an exception.  The Commission may allow the exception only if it finds that 
the proposed state or local requirement provides a significantly higher degree of 
protection from the risk of injury than does the Commission’s own rule, and that the 
different requirement does not unduly burden interstate commerce.178  These two 
requirements are so difficult to meet (and probably inherently contradictory) that the 
                                                                
173S.1224 § 502(b).   
174During his service with the House Energy and Commerce Committee and with the 
Commission, the author has frequently heard representatives of industries regulated by the 
Commission state in support of Commission regulations that they would prefer to deal with 
one Federal “gorilla” rather than dozens of state “monkeys.” 
175See supra note 119, and accompany text.. 
176CPSA § 26(a), 15 U.S.C. §2075(a).  Not all claims of preemption are sustained.  E.g., 
Chem. Specialty Mfrs Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
504 U.S. 825, 113 S. Ct. 80, 121 L.Ed.2d 44 (1992) (holding that California Proposition 65 
was not preempted by the FHSA); Accord, People ex re. Lungren v. Cotter & Co., 53 Cal. 
App.4th 1373, 1392-93, 62 Cal Rptr.2d 368, 381-82 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1997) (characterizing a 
Commission Office of the General Counsel opinion that the FHSA did preempt Proposition 65 
as “clearly erroneous”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997), rehearing denied, 522 U.S. 1099 
(1998).  The preemptive effect of a statute administered by the Commission (in this case the 
FLAMMABLE FABRICS ACT, Pub. L. 83-88, 67 Stat. 111, June 30, 1953, as amended, codified at 
15 U.S.C. 1191-1204 (2000)), and the Commission’s regulations pertaining to the 
flammability of mattresses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1632.1-1632.63 (2003), may be tested shortly by 
California Technical Bulletin 603, also pertaining the flammability of mattresses.  California 
Technical Bulletin 603 become effective on January 1, 2005. 
177CPSA § 26(b), 15 U.S.C. §2075(b). 
178CPSA §26(c), 15 U.S.C. §2075(c).  Commission regulations governing such 
applications are set forth in 16 C.F.R. §§ 1061.1 – 1061.12 (2003). 
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Commission has never granted such an exemption, and applications are almost never 
submitted.179
The inconsistency of the Firearms Safety Act with the CPSA on the issue of 
preemption reveals once again that the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act had much 
more than safety on their minds.  In contrast to a system of preemption that has 
worked well for over thirty years for consumer products, the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act chose a completely different approach that subjects the firearms 
industry to the maximum possible inconsistency between the federal and state 
systems.  It is hard to justify why a firearm that is adequately safe according to 
federal regulations in one state is not safe in another state just because that other state 
has adopted a more stringent set of safety regulations.  If, however, the objective is 
maximum harassment of the firearms industry, leaving state and local governments 
free to impose inconsistent regulations makes a good deal of sense. 
5.  Recalls and Enforcement 
Unenforced regulations are of only hortatory effect, a fact recognized by the 
Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA.  But, as was the case with rulemaking, the recall 
authority granted to the Attorney General by the Firearms Safety Act is wider and its 
exercise is subject to fewer restrictions than that exercised by the Commission.  Such 
more far reaching authority is also consistent with an objective of granting the 
Attorney General more power than is truly necessary to achieve any safety effect in 
the case of firearms. 
a.  Prospective Violations 
The Firearms Safety Act authorizes the Attorney General to issue certain types of 
orders in certain circumstances.  The Attorney General may issue an order 
prohibiting the manufacture, sale or transfer of a firearm product, which the Attorney 
General finds has been manufactured, imported, transferred or distributed in 
violation of a regulation prescribed under the Act.180  This authority also extends to 
instances where the Attorney General finds that there is an intent to import, transfer 
or distribute a firearm product in violation of the regulations.181  Not surprisingly, the 
Firearms Safety Act gives no guidance about how the Attorney General would 
establish intent.  There is no comparable grant of authority to the Commission under 
the CPSA.  While it is certainly unlawful to manufacture for sale, distribute or 
import a consumer product that violates an applicable consumer product safety 
                                                                
179The Commission has received only one application under CPSA § 26(c).  In 1981 the 
Commission adopted a consumer product safety standard for unvented gas-fired space heaters.  
The Commission received twenty-three applications from state and local governments asking 
for exemptions from the standard.  In response the Commission deferred a decision on the 
applications and began a rulemaking to revoke its own mandatory standard, citing the 
effectiveness of a voluntary standard developed by the American Gas Association and ANSI.  
“Commission Votes on Safety Standard,” Commission Press Release #83-031, June 1, 1983.  
The mandatory standard was eventually revoked.  “CPSC Revokes Its Mandatory Standard for 
Unvented Gas-Fired Space Heaters,” Commission Press Release #84-051, August 16, 1984. 
180S.1224, § 102(a). 
181S.1224, § 102(a). 
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standard, or which has been declared to be a banned hazardous product,182 the 
Commission’s remedy would be to proceed in court to obtain an injunction to 
restrain persons from distributing the products in question,183 or to work with the 
Custom’s Service to refuse entry to imported products.184  The sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act used the concept of “prior restraint” to grant more authority to 
the Attorney General than Congress has granted to the Commission. 
b.  Recalls 
Criteria 
Not all problems with products are discovered before distribution.  One of the 
most important sources of authority that an agency concerned with products can 
exercise is an ability to force some entity in the chain of distribution to notify 
consumers that there is a problem with a product and to take some other action.185  
Both the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA confer recall authority, although, as has 
been the case with every other provision of the Firearms Safety Act, the authority 
that it grants is broader and more standardless than that granted by the CPSA. 
The Firearms Safety Act empowers the Attorney General to issue a recall order if 
the Attorney General finds that the firearm product poses an unreasonable risk of 
injury to the public, does not comply with a regulation prescribed under the Act or is 
defective.186  The second of these three tests is relatively straight-forward:  the failure 
to conform to a regulation.  The other two are, however, more amorphous and 
subject to interpretation.  The first test, “poses an unreasonable risk of injury to the 
public,” appears to replicate the criteria that the Attorney General is instructed to use 
to promulgate regulations in the first place.187  If the regulations, once promulgated, 
do not cover the purported risk, how could the Attorney General plausibly argue that 
a particular characteristic now poses an unreasonable risk of injury to the public?  It 
is not unusual for manufacturers to take regulations into account when they design 
and manufacture products, and regulators usually take into account potential 
variations in a product when they write regulations.  If the Attorney General believes 
that a particular firearm characteristic constitutes an unreasonable risk to the public 
after the regulations are in force, the proper response should be to seek amendments 
to the regulations, subject to notice and comment rulemaking.  The existence of 
                                                                
182CPSA § 19(a)(1)-(2),  15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(1)-(2) (2000). 
183CPSA § 22(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2071(a)(1)-(3)(2000).  Such products are subject to 
condemnation in U.S. district court.  Id. at § 22(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2071(b)(1)-(2) (2000). 
184CPSA § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §2066(a) (2000). 
185Other Federal agencies dealing with products have the ability to force recalls:  the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (automobiles and associated equipment), the 
U.S. Coast Guard (boats and associated equipment), the Food and Drug Administration (food, 
drugs, medical devices, vaccines, blood and plasma products, cosmetics, pet and veterinary 
products), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (meat, poultry products, eggs) and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (pesticides, fungicides, rodenticides and vehicle emissions).  
http://www.recalls.gov. 
186S.1224, § 102(b). 
187S. 1224, § 101(a) says that the regulations must be reasonably necessary to reduce or 
prevent unreasonable risk of injury. 
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recall authority tied only to a finding of unreasonable risk, of course, makes such an 
exercise unnecessary.  It is totally consistent with the sponsors’ evident objective of 
giving as much authority as possible over the firearms industry to the Attorney 
General.  Exactly the same comments apply to the third circumstance (defective) 
under which the Attorney General may order a recall.  The Firearms Safety Act 
provides no definition of the term “defective,” and it is difficult to imagine how a 
firearm product could conform to regulations but nevertheless be defective.188  Like 
the rest of the recall authority of the Firearms Safety Act, amorphous criteria for 
ordering recalls is perfectly consistent with the objective of constituting the Attorney 
General as a “firearms czar,” even if it has little to do with safety. 
All of the three tests under the Firearms Safety Act lack other requirements that 
the Commission must establish in order to recall a consumer product under its CPSA 
authority.  The Commission may order a recall if it finds that a product represents a 
“substantial product hazard.”189  By contrast, rulemaking requires only a finding of 
unreasonable risk.190  The use of a different standard to establish when the 
Commission may order a recall than when it may engage in rulemaking,191 indicates 
that Congress believed that a different level of hazard was required for the 
Commission to order a recall, a distinction in which the sponsors of the Firearms 
Safety Act took no evident interest.  In order to make a determination that a product 
constitutes a substantial product hazard, the Commission must make a number of 
findings.  It must first find that the product in question either fails to comply with an 
applicable consumer product safety standard, or is defective.192  After having made 
one of those findings, the Commission must make the further finding that the failure 
to comply with the standard, or the defect, creates a substantial risk of injury to the 
public.193  Alternative one of the first part of the requirement is relatively straight-
forward, although always subject to questions of proof; either the product conforms 
to an applicable consumer product safety standard or the product does not.  The 
second alternative is more subjective, since the CPSA provides no definition of the 
term “defective.”194  If there is a voluntary standard, the Commission’s task is almost 
as easy as if there were a mandatory standard; in practice the Commission need only 
prove the existence of the voluntary standard and that the product fails to conform to 
                                                                
188BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (4th ed. 1968) defines defective as “lacking in some 
particular which is essential to the completeness, legal sufficiency or security of the object 
spoken of.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 345 (1969)  
defines defective as “lacking perfection; having a defect; faulty.” 
189CPSA § 2064(c)-(d) 345 (1969),15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d) (2000). 
190CPSA § 9(f)(3),15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(3) (2000). 
191The criteria which the Commission must use for rulemaking is discussed supra notes 
140 – 156 and accompanying text.  The basic criterion is that the rule must be reasonably 
necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with a product. 
192CPSA § 151(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a) (2000). 
193Id. 
194For common definitions of the term “defective” see supra note 188.  Commission 
regulations also define defect as a flaw, fault, or irregularity that causes weakness, failure or 
inadequacy in form or function, and contain a further discussion and examples of defects.  16 
C.F.R. § 1115.4 (2003). 
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it in a manner that impacts safety.195  If there is no pertinent voluntary standard that 
applies to the product, the Commission’s task is more difficult, since it must prove 
that the product fails to conform to some requirement that adversely impacts 
safety.196  The CPSA’s second requirement for the Commission to order a recall, 
“creates a substantial risk of injury to the public,” also creates some difficulty for the 
Commission, although at least the CPSA gives some guidance197  about the criteria 
that the Commission should consider in making its determination:  pattern of defect, 
number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or 
otherwise.198  The CPSA, therefore, establishes a much higher threshold of product 
hazard to justify a recall than does the Firearms Safety Act. 
Procedure for Ordering Recalls 
Basic due process requires that some type of procedure be followed before a 
public official can issue an order compelling a private person to take action.  The 
Firearms Safety Act takes a minimalist approach to procedures that must be followed 
                                                                
195The Commission has no mandatory standards for hair dryers, but it has conducted 26 
recalls of hair dryers since May 21, 1979 based on failures to conform with Underwriters 
Laboratories Household Electric Personal Grooming Appliances (UL 589) standard.  See, e.g., 
“CPSC, Light Distribution Inc. Announce Recall of Hair Dryers,” CPSC Recall Alert, March 
9, 2004; “CPSC, Fromm International-Solis® USA Announce Recall of Hair Dryers,” 
Commission Press Release #04-080, February 10, 2004; “CPSC, Remington Products Co., 
LLC Announce Recall of Hairdryers,” Commission Press Release #01-111, Mar. 21, 2001.  
Similarly, the Commission’s mandatory standards for cigarette lighters cover only child-
resistance, (16 C.F.R. §§ 1210.1—1210.20 (2003)), but the Commission has conducted recalls 
based on lighters failure to comply with ASTM F-400.  See, e.g., “CPSC, Halpern Import Co. 
Announce Recall of Cigarette Lighters,” Commission Press Release #00-189, September 28, 
2000; “CPSC, Shine International Trading Co. Inc. Announce Recall of Cigarette Lighters,” 
Commission Press Release #00-005, October 14, 1999 (the recall also involved failure to 
comply with mandatory child-resistance requirements); “CPSC And New York Lighter 
Announce Cigarette Lighter Recall, Commission Press Release #96-024, November 17, 1995. 
Finally, the Commission has no mandatory standards for carbon monoxide detectors, but it has 
conducted a number of recalls for failures to comply with Underwriters Laboratories Standard 
2034.  “CPSC, Kidde Safety Announce Recall of Carbon Monoxide Alarms,” Commission 
Press Release #99-082, March 19, 1999;  “CPSC Warns of Failures with Home Gas Sentry 
Carbon Monoxide Detectors distributed by Staley Solar & Stove, Commission Press Release 
#96-181, August 6, 1996; “CPSC Warns Of Failures With Sinostone Carbon Monoxide 
Detectors, Commission Press Release  #96-061, January 19, 1996.  There is no example of a 
manufacturer contending seriously that the failure to conform materially to a safety-related 
portion of a voluntary standard did not constitute a defect. 
196The best example of the difficulties that the Commission can face when it brings a case 
not based on a failure to conform to a mandatory or voluntary standard is In re Daisy 
Manufacturing Company.  See note 56 supra. 
197The criteria for determining “substantial risk of injury to the public” technically appears 
only in connection with a product defect, CPSA § 15(a)(2),15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(2)(2000) and 
not in connection with a failure to conform with a mandatory standard § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2064(a)(1) (2000), but there is no prohibition against using such criteria and, in practice, the 
Commission applies the same criteria to both circumstances in determining whether there is a 
substantial risk of injury to the public. 
198CPSA § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(2) (2000). 
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for the Attorney General to issue a recall order:  there are none.199  As in rulemaking, 
the Constitutional requirement of due process coupled with the Administrative 
Procedure Act would require that the Attorney General provide some type of hearing 
before issuing a recall order.200  It is instructive, however, that the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act did not even bother to refer to the Administrative Procedure Act 
and require that the minimum requirements of due process be followed before the 
Attorney General could order an action that might prove financially ruinous to a 
firearms manufacturer or dealer.  By contrast, the CPSA specifies that the 
Commission must follow the Administrative Procedure Act and hold a hearing 
before it may order a recall.201  The failure of the Firearms Safety Act to even 
mention the Administrative Procedure Act is, of course, completely consistent with a 
goal of providing the Attorney General with as much authority and as little 
accountability as possible vis-à-vis firearms industry. 
Recall Remedies 
Once an agency has found that there is a product defect that presents some sort of 
hazard to the public, it must also decide what the manufacturer, other entities in the 
chain of distribution, and the agency itself ought to do about it.  Many of the 
remedies contained in the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act are similar, but where 
they differ, the Firearms Safety Act confers more authority and grants greater 
discretion to the Attorney General than the CPSA grants to the Commission. 
Notice 
The first option is simply to warn the public against the hazard.  Both the 
Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA empower the Attorney General and the 
Commission, respectively to require manufacturers and other persons in the chain of 
distribution to provide notice,202 although the CPSA requires that the Commission 
make a further finding that such notification is in the public interest.203  The CPSA is 
also more specific about the ways that notice may be provided:204  
 
1. Public notice (generally a press release but on some occasions by paid 
advertising);205
                                                                
199S.1224 § 102(b) states merely that the “Attorney General may issue an order requiring 
the manufacturer of, and any dealer in, a firearm product to” take steps associated with a 
recall.  For a description of those steps, see infra notes 202-219 and accompanying text. 
200U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides that “No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .  The ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT §§ 554, 
556-57, 5 U.S.C. § 554, 556-57 (2000) sets forth the required procedures for adjudications. 
201CPSA § 15(c), (d), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c), (d), (f) (2000).  The Commission’s 
regulations for the conduct of such hearings are set forth in 16 C.F.R. §§ 1025.1—1025.68 
(2003). 
202S.1224 § 102(b), CPSA § 15(c)15 U.S.C. § 2064(c) (2000). 
203CPSA § 15 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c) (2000). 
204CPSA § 15(c)(1)-(3),15 U.S.C. §§ 2064(c)(1)-(3).  These mechanisms of notice are not 
set forth by way of limitation and the Commission now generally requires that manufacturers 
with sites on the world-wide web post notice of their recalls for a time on that site. 
205Most of the Commission’s recalls that are negotiated voluntarily with the manufacturers 
are accompanied by press releases.  One example of paid advertising was the settlement of the 
all-terrain vehicle litigation.  See United States v. American Honda, Civil Action No. 87-3525, 
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2. Notice mailed to manufacturers, distributors or retailers;206 and 
3. Notice mailed to each person to whom the product was delivered or 
sold.207
 
Repair, Replace, Refund 
Both the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA recognize that simple notice to 
consumers of a safety problem may be inadequate to protect the public.  Both the Act 
and the CPSA, therefore, empower the Attorney General and the Commission 
respectively to compel manufacturers and other entities in the chain of distribution to 
take further actions.  There are, however, significant differences between the Act and 
the CPSA that, not surprisingly, operate to the disadvantage of the firearms industry. 
In addition to the authority to compel a manufacturer or a dealer to give notice of 
a safety problem, the Firearms Safety Act authorizes the Attorney General to order a 
manufacturer or dealer to do the following:208
 
1. Bring the firearm into conformity with pertinent regulations; 
2. Repair the firearm; 
3. Replace the firearm with a complying like or equivalent product; 
4. Refund the purchase price, less an amount based on reasonable use if the 
firearm is over one year old; 
5. Recall the firearm; or 
6. Submit to the Attorney General a plan to implement an action ordered by 
the Attorney General. 
 
These remedies under the Firearms Safety Act track the remedies available to the 
Commission under the CPSA:209
 
1. Repair the defect or bring the product into conformity with an applicable 
consumer product safety rule; 
2. Replace the product with a like or equivalent product that does not contain 
the defect or which conforms to an applicable consumer product safety 
rule; or 
                                                          
(D.D.C. April 28, 1988); another example was the second recall of certain General Electric 
dishwashers agreed to in 2001.  CPSC No. RP990036 General Electric Appliances Division, 
Amendment to Settlement Agreement, § 2(v), Dec. 12, 2000. 
206It is hard to imagine the circumstances under which notice would have to be mailed to 
the manufacturer of a product, since the manufacturer is almost always in charge of the recall.  
Notifying distributors and retailers is, however, essential to removing recalled products from 
the chain of distribution. 
207This remedy is limited to those circumstances in which a manufacturer, distributor or 
retailer knows the addresses of the purchasers.  This knowledge may be high in the case of 
mail order or Internet sales, but may be almost nonexistent in the case of sales of inexpensive 
items by retailers. 
208S.1224 § 102(b).  The remedies are phrased in the disjunctive, but since the last remedy 
requires a plan for implementing “any action” required by an Attorney General’s order, it 
appears that the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act probably intended for the Attorney 
General to have the authority to fashion an order including one or more of the specified 
remedies.  Moreover, virtually any of the other remedies described in the Firearms Safety Act 
would necessarily involve notice. S.1224, § 102(b)(1).  
209CPSA § 15(d)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2064(d)(1)-(3) (2000). 
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3. Refund the purchase price of the product, less a reasonable allowance for 
use if the product has been in the possession of the consumer for one year 
or longer. 
 
The remedies available to the Attorney General under the Firearms Safety Act 
include one remedy not normally available to the Commission210:  the “recall” of a 
firearm from the stream of commerce.211  What the sponsors of S.1224 believe to be 
a “recall” that would not involve the repair or replacement of, or a refund for, the 
firearm is not apparent from either the text of the Act (since recall is not a defined 
term) or their statements in introducing the bill.  Its use, however, may empower the 
Attorney General to devise some sort of remedy above and beyond the remedies 
available to the Commission when it seeks to recall defective products.  One 
possibility might be a recall that imposes some charge to consumers.  The CPSA 
specifically states that no charge shall be made to any person, other than a 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer, who takes advantage of a remedy under a recall 
order and that such persons are entitled to reimbursement for reasonable and 
foreseeable expenses.212  The lack of such a section in the Firearms Safety Act 
creates the possibility that the Attorney General might order a recall that imposes 
some costs on consumers.  Since consumers in this case are firearms owners, the fact 
that they might have to pay something for the privilege of having their gun recalled 
probably did not trouble the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act at all. 
In addition to granting the Attorney General an authority that is beyond those 
granted in the CPSA, the Firearms Safety Act also omits one important protection 
granted to manufacturers, distributors and retailers by the CPSA.  The person to 
whom an order under Section 15 of the CPSA is addressed may elect the remedy:  
repair the product, replace the product, or refund the purchase price.213  The lack of 
                                                                
210The recall remedy is available to a district court when the Commission has brought an 
action seeking to declare a product an “imminently hazardous consumer product.”  CPSA § 
12(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2061(b)(1) (2000).  No case law explaining the difference between a 
“recall” and the ordinary “repair, replace and refund” remedies of the CPSA has been 
developed.  For a discussion of the circumstances under which the Commission can seek to 
have a product declared imminently hazardous, see infra notes 220-225, and accompanying 
text. 
211The Firearms Safety Act also has a remedy of bringing the firearm into conformance 
with pertinent regulations.  S.1224 § 102(b)(2).  The sponsors do not explain just how this 
remedy would differ from a repair remedy, and it raises the possibility that the Firearms Safety 
Act could be interpreted to require retroactive changes to firearms even in the absence of a 
defect requiring a repair.   
212CPSA § 15(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(e)(1)(2000).  The Commission did agree to a recall 
in the case of dishwashers manufactured by General Electric in which consumers received a 
rebate against the purchase of a new dishwasher.  Consumers obviously had to pay the balance 
of the price of the new dishwasher.  Commission Press Release #00-006 “CPSC, GE 
Announce Recall of Dishwashers” (Oct. 18, 1999).  That recall was, however, later modified 
to give consumers the option to rewire their existing dishwashers at no charge.  “CPSC and 
GE Announce Free Repair Supplement of Rebate Program for Recalled Dishwashers: 
Recalled Units Still Being Used, Creating Risk of Fire” Commission Press Release #01-054 
(Dec. 14, 2000). 
213CPSA § 15(d).  15 U.S.C. §2064(d)(2000).  The Commission does have the authority to 
require that a person subject to a recall order to submit a plan acceptable to the Commission 
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such a right of election could lead, for example, to an Attorney General’s order that a 
manufacturer conduct a very expensive repair on older model firearms, when refund 
would be a more economically rational solution.  It might also result in an order 
requiring replacement when a simple repair would be adequate for safety.  An 
Attorney General not well disposed to the private ownership of firearms would have 
every incentive to order refunds (which require the return of the product to claim the 
refund) with the least allowance possible for “reasonable use.”  Such refunds would 
have the effect of removing as many firearms as possible from private ownership.  
They would also give firearms owners a substantial financial incentive to return the 
firearm, with the cost borne by the recalling manufacturer.  The manufacturer on the 
receiving end of such an order would have only a claim of lack of constitutional due 
process upon which to base a challenge to the order.  As in so many other aspects, 
the Firearms Safety Act gives the Attorney General significantly more power over 
the firearms’ industry than the CPSA gives the Commission over consumer products. 
It is also possible that the Firearms Safety Act might be interpreted to extend 
even to sales of recalled firearms in the hands of private persons, a remedy the CPSA 
does not make available to the Commission.  Section 201(f) of the Firearms Safety 
Act makes it illegal for any person to offer for sale or distribute in commerce a 
firearm product that does not conform to the regulations prescribed by the Attorney 
General, or in violation of an order issued under the authority of the Act (emphasis 
added).  Insofar as the Firearms Safety Act seeks to make illegal the sale or transfer 
of a firearm that does not conform to regulations, it is similar to the provisions of the 
CPSA.214  The situation may, however, be different in the case of products and 
                                                          
describing how it will carry out the remedy that it has elected.  Id.  The Commission may also 
reopen a case if it finds that the execution of the remedy is not protecting the public 
adequately.  16 C.F.R. § 1025.58 (2003).  The Commission exercised this authority when it 
found that not enough consumers were taking advantage of a rebate option offered by General 
Electric for some defective dishwashers.  A subsequent recall by General Electric offered 
consumers the option of rewiring the control panel to eliminate the hazard.  “CPSC and GE 
Announce Free Repair Supplement of Rebate Program for Recalled Dishwashers:  Recalled 
Units Still Being Used, Creating Risk of Fire” Commission Press Release #01-054 (Dec. 14, 
2000).  There was also a discussion at the hearing on the Commission’s Fiscal Year 2003 
Appropriation of the circumstances under which the Commission could reopen an 
investigation.  Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 2003: Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Part 2, 107th CONG., 676-78, 686 
(2002).  There have been legislative proposals to eliminate this election of remedies.  (e.g., 
H.R. 4586, 105th CONG. 2000).  But none of them have been the subject of even congressional 
subcommittee consideration.  See Jayne O’Donnell, Tougher Product Safety Bill Offered, USA 
TODAY, May 12, 2000, at A1; Statement of the Honorable Mary Sheila Gall in Opposition to 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission Enhanced Enforcement Act of 2000 (May 12, 
2000) (on file with author and with the Secretary of the Commission.). 
214CPSA § 19(a)(1) and (2) 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(1)-(2)(2000) makes it unlawful for any 
person to offer for sale or distribute in commerce any consumer product that does not conform 
to an applicable consumer product safety standard or which has been declared to be a banned 
hazardous product.  The Commission has never sought to collect a civil penalty from a private 
person based on a single sale of product that did not conform to a mandatory standard or was  
a banned hazardous product.  Even in the case of manufacturers, distributors and private 
labelers, establishing a violation of the CPSA requires a showing of actual knowledge that the 
product did not conform, or a notice from the Commission that distribution would be a 
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firearms that have been the subject of recalls.  It is not unlawful for a private person 
to sell or otherwise transfer a consumer product that is the subject of a recall order of 
the Commission.215  The Commission has, in fact, devoted considerable attention to 
try and remove recalled products from the hands of private individuals.216  Likewise 
the authority of the Attorney General to conduct ordinary recalls is limited to orders 
directed to manufacturers and dealers.217  The extraordinary authority conferred by 
Section 102(c) of the Firearms Safety Act218 is, however, not limited to 
manufacturers and dealers.  The Attorney General might issue an order forbidding 
any “transfer or distribution” of a firearm under the authority of this section, 
including transfers between private individuals.219  The possibility of making 
otherwise lawful sales of firearms between private individuals illegal by means of an 
order, rather than by legislation or even regulation, is yet one more example of the 
extreme measures that the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act went to give the 
                                                          
violation.  CPSA §§ 19(a)(1), (2), and 20(a)(1), (2) CPSA § 19(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2068(a)(1),(2) and 2069(a)(1), (2)(2000). 
215CPSA § 19(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(5) makes it unlawful to fail to comply with an 
order issued under Section 15(c) or (d) of the CPSA.  Those subsections, however, authorize 
the Commission to issue orders only to manufacturers, distributors and retailers. 
216The Commission hired a contractor to study the literature on recall effectiveness.  
Recall Effectiveness Research:  A Review and Summary of the Literature on Consumer 
Motivation and Behavior, CPSC Order No. CPSC-F-02-1391, Contract Number 
GS232F97804, July 2003.  The Commission also held three public meetings on recall 
effectiveness.  Summary of CPSC Recall Effectiveness Meeting #1, “Motivating Consumers to 
Respond to Recalls,” May 15, 2003; Summary of CPSC Recall Effectiveness Meeting #2, 
“New Tools for Recall Effectiveness,” July 25, 2003.  The third meeting was held on 
September 9, 2003 and dealt with the measurement of the effectiveness of recalls.  A summary 
of all three meetings is presently being prepared.  Despite these efforts to improve recall 
effectiveness, items that have been the subject of recalls have also been associated with deaths 
after the recall has been announced.  Recent Death Prompts Search for Recalled Play 
Yards/Cribs, Baby Trend Launches New Effort to Find Those Still in Use, Commission Press 
Release #01-094 (Feb. 28, 2001).  Even products that have been banned both by statute and by 
regulations for relatively long periods of time can continue to be associated with injuries.  For 
example, lawn darts were banned by Congress in 1988.  Pub. L. 100-613, 102 Stat. 3183, Nov. 
5, 1988, (requiring Consumer Products Safety Commission to revoke a previous exemption 
from its general ban of sharp pointed toys that had permitted the sale of lawn darts and other 
sharp-pointed toy exceptions).  The Commission implemented the law through regulations.  16 
CFR §§ 1306.1-1306.5 (2003).  Yet injuries associated with the use of lawn darts continue 
almost fifteen years after the ban.  “Youth feels ‘pretty good’ after yard-dart injury,” SOUTH 
BEND TRIBUNE, August 14, 2003.    
217S.1224 § 102(b).  The authority of a court entering an order in cases involving 
imminently hazardous firearms is similarly limited to manufacturers and dealers.  S.1224, § 
303.  For a discussion of how the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA treat imminently 
hazardous firearms and products respectively, see fn. 220 through 227 and accompanying text, 
infra.  
218For a discussion of the procedural and substantive difficulties associated with this 
section see supra notes 158 – 163 and accompanying text. 
219Presumably the order would be phrased so as to permit a transfer to the manufacturer or 
dealer for purposes of implementing a repair, replace, refund or recall order, although there is 
no explicit requirement in the subsection that it do so. 
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Attorney General plenary authority over the firearms industry and even over private 
citizens who own firearms. 
c.  Expedited Procedures 
Both the Firearms Safety Act and the CPSA recognize that the ordinary processes 
of recall may be inadequate to protect the public and both provide for expedited 
procedures.  The standard to implement such expedited procedures is, however, 
much less under the Firearms Safety Act than it is under the CPSA.  Section 12 of 
the CPSA220 authorizes the Commission to proceed in U.S. district court against 
“imminently hazardous consumer products.”  Such products are defined as products 
which present an imminent and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness or severe 
personal injury.221  If the Commission can establish that a product is an imminent 
hazard, the U.S. district court may order temporary or permanent relief as may be 
necessary to protect the public from the risk.  This relief may include the seizure of 
the product, notice to the public, recall, the repair or replacement of, or refund for, 
the product.222  The Commission must, however, begin rulemaking to establish 
regulations for products that are the subject of an imminently hazardous product 
action.223  In addition to its authority to proceed against imminently hazardous 
products, the Commission has the authority to apply to a U.S. district court to 
restrain distribution of a product when the Commission has filed an administrative 
complaint seeking to declare the product a substantial product hazard.224  Such an 
action, however, grants the court authority only to restrain distribution of the product 
and does not include the authority to order notice, repair, replacement or refund.  
Moreover, a preliminary injunction granted by the court may last only so long as the 
administrative proceeding seeking to declare the product a substantial product hazard 
continues.225
Like the CPSA, the Firearms Safety Act contemplates the possibility of expedited 
enforcement procedures.  Section 303 of the Act gives the Attorney General the 
authority to bring an action in U.S. district court to restrain the manufacture, 
distribution, transfer, import or export of an imminently hazardous firearm product.  
This is similar to the authority that the court has under Section 15(g) of the CPSA, 
but is not as far reaching as the authority granted to the court under Section 12.  The 
threshold to obtain expedited relief is, however, much lower in the case of the 
Firearms Safety Act than the CPSA.  An “imminently hazardous firearm product” 
means only that a firearm poses an unreasonable risk of injury to the public and that 
“time is of the essence.”226  “Unreasonable risk of injury” is, of course, precisely the 
                                                                
22015 U.S.C. § 2061. 
221CPSA § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2061(a). 
222CPSA § 12(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2061(b)(1)(2000).  The term “recall” is not defined in the 
CPSA.  The other remedies clearly track those available to the Commission.  CPSA §15(c) 
and (d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c)-(d). 
223CPSA § 12(a),  15 U.S.C. § 2061(a). 
224CPSA § 15(g)(l),  15 U.S.C. § 2064(g)(1). 
225CPSA § 15(g), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(g). 
226S.1224 § 3(a)(6). 
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standard that the Attorney General applies both for rulemaking and for “ordinary” 
recalls.227  In light of the very minimal due process requirements contained in other 
sections of the Firearms Safety Act, the imminent hazard proceeding authority seems 
likely to be used simply when the Attorney General is in a hurry.  Nor is there any 
requirement in the Firearms Safety Act that the Attorney General begin a rulemaking 
proceeding concerning the type of firearm products that were the subject of the 
imminent hazard proceeding.  Since one objective of the Firearms Safety Act is most 
likely the removal of as many firearms as possible from commerce and private 
ownership, the sponsors evidently felt no need for there to be some regulations 
permitting the sale of some reasonably safe version of the firearm products that were 
the subject of the imminent hazard proceeding. 
6.  Penalties 
Both the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act recognize that members of the 
regulated community may not always comply with the law and that penalties may 
need to be imposed.  There are, however, differences in the circumstances under 
which penalties may be imposed, and those differences make it more likely that 
members of the firearms industry will be subjected to penalties than will industries 
regulated by the Commission.  The CPSA contains both civil and criminal 
penalties.228  Persons who sell, offer for sale, distribute in commerce or import 
consumer products that do not comply with a consumer product safety standard, or 
which are banned hazardous products are subject to civil penalties.229  These civil 
penalties, may, however, be imposed only in cases where the manufacturer, 
distributor or private labeler of the product had actual knowledge that the distribution 
was a violation, or if that person had received notice from the Commission that the 
distribution would be a violation.230  Imposition of a criminal penalty requires both a 
knowing and willful violation, coupled with receipt of notice of noncompliance from 
the Commission.231  In contrast to the civil penalty provisions of the CPSA, the 
Firearms Safety Act contains no scienter requirement at all for the imposition of a 
civil penalty.232  The apparent imposition of strict liability is yet another example of 
the intent of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act to subject the firearms industry 
to the maximum amount of government authority.  The Firearms Safety Act’s 
imposition of criminal penalties more closely tracks that of the CPSA in that it 
requires that notice from the Attorney General be received.  Even here the scienter 
requirement is “knowingly,” rather than the higher “willfully” standard contained in 
                                                                
227For a discussion of the standards used for regulations and for recalls, see supra notes 
134 – 139 and 186 – 188, and accompanying text. 
228Civil and criminal penalties are set forth in CPSA §§ 20, 21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2069-2070. 
229CPSA §§ 19(a)(1), (2), 20(a)(l),  15 U.S.C. §§ 2068(a)(1), (2), 2069(a)(1).  These are 
not the only grounds for which the Commission can assess a civil penalty under the CPSA.  
See CPSA § 19(a)(3)-(11),15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(3)-(11). 
230CPSA § 20(a)(2)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
231CPSA § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2070(a). 
232S.1224 § 301(a)(1). 
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the CPSA,233 a minor, yet telling, example of the evident intent of the Firearms 
Safety Act sponsors to be as harsh as possible on the firearms industry. 
7.  Reporting 
In addition to conferring on the Commission the authority to recall products, 
CPSA Section 15(b)234 imposes a major reporting obligation on the regulated 
community.  Manufacturers, distributors and retailers of consumer products must 
report to the Commission when they “obtain information which reasonably supports 
the conclusion” that such product:235
 
1. Fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety standard; 
2. Fails to comply with a voluntary standard in reliance upon which the 
Commission has terminated rulemaking; 
3. Creates a defect which could create a substantial product hazard; or  
4. Creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death. 
 
Manufacturers, distributors and retailers are excused from making such reports only 
when they have “actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately 
informed” of the defect, the failure to comply, or the risk.236  The Commission has 
developed interpretive regulations to assist manufacturers, distributors and retailers 
to understand their reporting obligations,237 and many of the civil penalty cases in 
which the Commission has obtained a judgment or which have been settled have 
been for violations of this reporting requirement.238  In addition to the reporting 
requirement of Section 15(b), Section 37 of the CPSA239 creates an obligation under 
certain circumstances for manufacturers to report product liability lawsuits involving 
death or grievous bodily injury that have been settled or which have been the subject 
of a judgment for the plaintiff.240  
                                                                
233S.1224 § 351. 
23415 U.S.C. § 2064(b). 
235CPSA § 15(b)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(1)-(3). 
236CPSA § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b). 
23716 C.F.R. §§ 1115.1-1115.15 (2003). 
238The Commission obtained summary judgment for failure to report incidents of an 
exploding juicer in United States v. Mirama Enterprises, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1158-59 
(C.D. Cal. 2002), resulting in a civil penalty assessment of $300,000.  In fiscal year 2002 the 
Commission obtained negotiated civil penalties, consent decrees or judgments for failure to 
make required reports in six cases, resulting in civil penalties of $2.975 million.  Negotiated 
civil penalties, consent decrees and judgments in all regulated products cases also numbered 
six cases, but resulted in penalties of $895,000.  U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
2002 Annual Report to Congress (2000).  European safety agencies are beginning to impose a 
reporting requirement.  See European Manufacturers Required to Report Hazardous Products 
Under New EU Rules, 32 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 71, 85 (2004).  “German Product 
Safety Law ‘Raises Bar’ For Reporting Potential Safety Hazards,” 32 Prod. Safety & Liab. 
Rep. (BNA) 71, 86 (2004). 
23915 U.S.C. § 2084 (2000). 
240Section 37 of the CPSA creates a complicated system of reporting in which three or 
more product liability judgments or settlements concerning a particular model of consumer 
product must be reported when they occur within two years.  The two year “clock” began 
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The Firearms Safety Act creates no similar obligation for manufacturers or 
dealers to disclose failures to conform to regulations, other safety problems, or court 
judgments or settlements to the Attorney General.  This is one of the few instances in 
which the CPSA is actually more severe on industry than is the Firearms Safety Act.  
Perhaps the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act simply overlooked these obligations 
of the CPSA when they drafted their own bill.  One other, more plausible, 
explanation is that, since the real objective of the Firearms Safety Act is to subject 
the firearms industry to as much government control as possible, reporting of 
genuine safety concerns by a manufacturer or dealer was of no interest to the 
sponsors of the Act. 
8.  Applicability to Governments 
Federal, state and local governmental entities purchase and use consumer 
products.  Many governmental entities also purchase and issue firearms as weapons 
for law enforcement personnel.241  Government entities have a considerable interest 
in preserving the safety of their employees, both for public efficiency and 
humanitarian reasons; therefore they have an interest in purchasing and using only 
safe consumer products and safe firearms.  The approach taken by the CPSA and the 
Firearms Safety Act towards governmental entities is, however, fundamentally 
different. 
Section 26(b) of the CPSA242 contains a limited exemption for states and their 
political subdivisions.  Such entities may have safety requirements that are 
inconsistent with a consumer product safety standard if the requirement is for the use 
of the state or the political subdivision and it provides a higher degree of protection 
than does the Commission-issued standard (emphasis added).  This section provides 
an option for state and local governments when they play the role of consumers: they 
are free to choose a product that is safer than the minimum requirements set by a 
consumer product safety standard.243  Since states and local governments may set 
                                                          
January 1, 1991 and is “reset” on January 1 of odd-numbered years.  For example, the time 
period that began running on January 1, 2003 ended on December 31, 2004.  On January 1, 
2005, another two year time period began running. 
241While most firearms are carried by local police, state police and federal police such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Secret Service, many persons might be surprised to 
learn the number of Federal agencies that have some persons authorized to carry firearms 
(E.g., Department of Agriculture employees engaged in animal quarantine (7 U.S.C. § 2274 
(2000)), officers or employees of the Department of the Interior within areas of the National 
Park System (16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(b)(1) (2000)), special agents and law enforcement officers of 
the Forest Service (16 U.S.C. § 559(e)(1) (2000)), law enforcement officers of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (18 U.S.C. § 3063(a)(1) (2000)), officers and contractors of 
the Atomic Energy Commission (now Nuclear Regulatory Commission) (42 U.S.C. §2201(k) 
(2000)), officers and employees of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (42 
U.S.C. § 2456 (2000)), and employees and contractors of the Department of Energy guarding 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (42 U.S.C. § 7270a(1) (2000)).  See generally, Dave Kopel & 
Robert Racansky, Day-Dream Believers (2002) available at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
kopel/kopel073002.asp. 
24215 U.S.C. § 2075(b) (2000). 
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purchase requirements by some type of regulation or specification, this section of the 
CPSA allows them to avoid the technical charge that their acquisition regulation is 
preempted by the Federal standard. 
The Firearms Safety Act, by contrast, takes a completely different approach to 
state and local government purchases of firearms.  Section 202 of the Act states 
simply that the prohibitions of Section 201 do not apply to any department or agency 
of the United States, of a state, of a political subdivision of a state, or to any official 
conduct of an officer or employee of such a department or agency.  Governmental 
entities and their officers are not prohibited from taking the following activities 
forbidden to ordinary firearms’ consumers: 
 
1. Importing or exporting firearm products that are not accompanied by a 
certificate stating that the firearms product conform to applicable 
regulations;244   
2. Manufacturing, offering for sale, distributing in commerce and importing 
or exporting firearms products that are not in conformity with regulations 
prescribed under the Act, or which violate an order issued under the 
authority of the Act;245 or 
3. Manufacturing, purchasing or importing a firearm product after a date that 
a regulation is prescribed under the Act, at a rate significantly greater than 
the rate at which the government entity manufactured, purchased or 
imported the product during a “base period” that the Attorney General 
specified by regulation (stockpiling).246
 
Despite the convoluted phrasing of the exemption,247 its intent is easily 
discernible: government entities may purchase firearm products that do not comply 
with the mandatory regulations specified by the Attorney General, or which have 
been recalled by the Attorney General, or which may even have been the subject of 
an imminently hazardous firearm product proceeding.  Just why the sponsors of the 
Firearms “Safety” Act would want to permit access to “unsafe” firearms by law 
enforcement personnel is mysterious if the true objective of the Act is safety.248  
Since other portions of this article have made it clear that the genuine objective of 
the Firearms Safety Act is to hand plenary authority over the firearms industry to the 
Attorney General, it is perfectly consistent to exempt governmental entities and their 
                                                          
243For example, a state might want to purchase walk-behind lawn mowers for use by state 
employees with guards that prevent entry by probes even smaller than those required by the 
Commission’s regulations.  16 C.F.R. § 1205.4 (2003).  Such a guard would provide more 
protection from inadvertent contact between the blade and the operator’s hands and feet. 
244S.1224 § 201(e). 
245S.1224 § 201(f). 
246S.1224 § 201(g). 
247The scope of the exemption is not precisely clear since S.1224, § 201(a), (b), (c), and 
(d) apply to manufacturers, dealers and importers.  These activities are usually carried on by 
contractors for the government.  The exemptions of S.1224, § 201(e), (f), and (g) apply to 
persons, which would include government entities in their role as firearms consumers. 
248Since many police officers take their firearms home with them, the exemption would 
have the effect of putting not only the government officials, but also their families (and 
especially children) at risk if the true objective of the Act were safety.   
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officials from the prohibitions.  After all, what concern do the sponsors of the 
Firearms Safety Act have about concealability, large ammunition capacity and 
larger, more lethal ammunition, if weapons with these characteristics are to be in the 
hands of politically-reliable police or regulatory authorities?  And what need do such 
persons have for magazine disconnectors and loaded chamber indicators, which the 
sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act believe must be present in firearms sold to the 
general public?  The attitude of the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act is, not 
surprisingly, fully consistent with many other restrictions on firearms ownership that 
apply to mere private citizens, but not to the exalted officials of government.249
9.  Testing, Certification, Labeling and Prior Notice 
Both the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act contain sections concerning testing, 
certification and labeling of consumer products and firearm products respectively.  
The CPSA requires that manufacturers and private labelers of consumer products 
that are subject to mandatory standards provide a certification that the product 
conforms to the standard.250  Section 201(a) of the Firearms Safety Act creates a 
similar obligation on the part of manufacturers to test and certify that their firearm 
products conform to the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.251 The 
labeling requirements also resemble each other.252  The Firearms Safety Act, 
                                                                
249A complete discussion of law enforcement exemptions to gun laws applicable to the 
general public is beyond the scope of this article. A few examples will suffice.  The Federal 
ban on “assault weapons,” did not apply to law enforcement personnel.  18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(4) 
(2000).  Maryland law requiring personalized handgun technology does not apply to law 
enforcement personnel.  MD Code Public Safety § 5-132(b)(1) (2003).  Massachusetts’ 
requirements that sales of firearms and large capacity weapons must be accompanied by a 
safety device do not apply to weapons distributed to officers of a law enforcement agencies, 
(Mass. Gen. Law. c. 140, § 131K) (2004)), nor do its prohibitions on large capacity weapons 
(id. § 131(a)).  Illinois exempts peace officers from the requirement to obtain a firearms owner 
identification card.  720 ILCS 5/24-2(a)(1).  California waiting periods and requirements for 
handgun safety certification do not apply to peace officers.  West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code 
S12078(a)(1) and (2) (2004).  For a critique of such exemptions, see D. Kopel and R. 
Racansky, “Day-Dream Believers:  A law that antigun folks would die for,” supra, and J. 
Snyder, “A Nation of Cowards,” 113 The Public Interest 40, 46-48 (1993). 
250CPSA § 14(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(1) (2000).  Commission regulations generally 
specify the testing that is required for the manufacturer to certify that it meets the requirements 
of a consumer product safety standard.  CPSA § 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2063(b) (2000).  For 
example, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1204.11—1204.17 (2003) contain the certification and production 
testing requirements for omnidirectional citizens band base station antennas, and §§ 1205.30 – 
1205.36 (2003) contain the certification, production testing and labeling requirements for 
walk-behind lawn mowers. 
251In the case of consumer products the manufacturer’s certification need only be delivered 
as far as the retailer.  CPSA § 14(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(1) (2000).  In the case of firearms 
products the certification must be to each person to whom the product is distributed.  S.1224, 
§§ 201(a)(3), (c)(5). 
252CPSA § 14(c) 15 U.S.C. § 2063(c) (2000) authorizes the Commission to require a label 
containing:  (1) the date and place of manufacture; (2) a suitable identification of the 
manufacturer; and (3) a certification that the consumer product meets all applicable consumer 
product safety standards.  S.1224, § 201(c) requires:  (1) name and address of the 
manufacturer; (2) name and address of the importer; (3) model number of the firearm product 
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however, contains a requirement that  a manufacturer provide notice to the Attorney 
General that the manufacturer intends to manufacture a new type of firearm product 
and a description of the product,253 a requirement that has no corresponding section 
in the CPSA.  Since “firearm product” includes a great number of products,254 yet 
with no definition of “type”, the requirement to give notice to the Attorney General 
might be construed to be virtually any modification of a manufacturer’s product line.  
The potential for civil penalty actions for failure to report whatever the Attorney 
General later deemed to be a new “type” of firearm product are clear, and probably 
something the Act’s sponsors welcomed. 
10.  Information Disclosure to the Public  
Providing information to the public about safety hazards and how to use products 
safely is one of the ways that any governmental agency concerned with safety seeks 
to fulfill its mission.  Both the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act charge the 
Commission and the Attorney General, respectively, with educating the public about 
the hazards associated with the use of consumer products and firearms 
respectively.255  Both the Commission and the Attorney General are subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).256  The CPSA, however, contains a specific 
exception to FOIA that protects members of the regulated community from 
                                                          
and date of manufacture; (4) a specification of regulations applicable to the firearm product; 
and (5) the required certificate. 
253S.1224, § 201(b). 
254“Firearm product” includes firearm, firearm part, nonpowder firearm and ammunition.  
S.1224, § 3(a)(3). 
255CPSA § 2(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(2) (2000) states explicitly that one of the purposes 
of the CPSA is “to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer 
products.”  In addition, CPSA § 5(a)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(1-4) (2000), requires the 
Commission specifically to (1) maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse to collect, 
investigate, analyze and disseminate injury data and information; (2) conduct studies and 
investigations of deaths, injuries and diseases resulting from accidents involving consumer 
products; (3) assist private-public organizations to develop safety standards; (4) assist private 
and public organizations in the development of safety standards.  S.1224, § 401(a) similarly 
requires the Attorney General to coordinate with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to collect, investigate, analyze and share with other government agencies the circumstances of 
deaths and injury associated with firearms, and to conduct studies of the costs and losses 
resulting from firearm-related deaths and injuries.  In addition, the Attorney General is 
required to research and study the safety of firearm products and how to improve that safety.  
Id. at § 401(b)(2).  The results of these studies are to be made available to the public.  Id. 
at § 401(c).  Whether or not the Attorney General would conduct information and education 
campaigns on the safe use of firearms seems problematic given the general orientation of the 
Firearms Safety Act against the firearms industry and the private ownership of firearms, 
coupled with the other responsibilities of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. 
256Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), codified by Pub. 
L. No. 90-23 (1967) at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  A discussion of FOIA is beyond the scope of 
this article.  In general FOIA creates an obligation for a Federal agency to disclose information 
that it has at the request of the public, unless a specific exemption exists authorizing it not to 
disclose the information.  The Commission’s regulations pertaining to FOIA are contained in 
16 CFR §§ 1015.1—1015.19 (2003). 
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premature disclosures of information about the safety of their products that might 
prove damaging in the marketplace.  Section 6(b) of the CPSA257 requires the 
Commission to perform a number of steps before it can release information about 
product safety that would permit the public to readily ascertain the manufacturer or 
private labeler to which the information pertains:258
 
1. the Commission must give the manufacturer or private labeler thirty days 
notice of its intent to release the information and also give the 
manufacturer or private labeler an opportunity to comment on the 
proposed release; 
2. the Commission must take reasonable steps to assure that the information 
that it proposes to release is accurate, including procedures to ensure such 
accuracy, and to determine that  disclosure is fair under the circumstances 
and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of the CPSA; 
3. if the Commission does release the information it must, at the request of 
the manufacturer or private labeler, include the comments or other 
information submitted by the manufacturer or private labeler in response 
to the information that the Commission proposes to release; 
4. if the manufacturer or private labeler objects to the release of all or a 
portion of the information the Commission must notify the manufacturer 
or private labeler of its intent and give the manufacturer or private labeler 
ten days notice; 
5. if the Commission gives the manufacturer or private labeler the notice 
required above, the manufacturer or private labeler may bring an action in 
U.S. district court to enjoin the Commission from releasing the 
information. 
 
There are a number of exceptions to the elaborate procedures set forth above; mostly 
relating to situations in which the Commission has already taken action concerning a 
product.259  There are also requirements for retractions in the event that the 
Commission finds it has made a mistake in a previous release.260  These restrictions 
on the Commission’s ability to release information have been criticized261 and have 
                                                                
25715 U.S.C. § 2055(b) (2000).  Section 6(a) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2000), 
contains a separate exemption for trade secret or confidential business information. 
258CPSA § 6(b)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §2055(b)(1)-(3), (6) (2000).  Section 6(b) of the CPSA 
applies to FOIA requests.  Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 US 102, 
108-111 (1980). 
259CPSA § 6(b)(4), (5),  15 U.S.C. § 2055(6)(b)(4), (5) (2000).  
260CPSA § 6(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(7) (2000). 
261CPSA § 6(b)(7).  MARLA FELCHER, supra note 89, at 121-23, 190-93.  Some consumer 
groups have advocated the outright repeal of the CPSA § 6(b).  See, Submitted testimony, p. 4 
of Rachel Weintraub, Assistant General Counsel, Consumer Federation of America and 
submitted testimony pp. 10-14 of R. David Pittle, Senior Vice President for Technical Policy, 
Consumers Union, before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Product Safety of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, June 17, 2003.  [The bound 
version of the transcript of the hearing has yet to be made available by the Government 
Printing Office.]  See also, “Consumers Bombarded with Information, But Still Uninformed, 
CU Head Says,” 32 Product Safety & Liability 271 (2004), quoting James Guest, Executive 
Director of Consumers Union as advocating removal of the restrictions of CPSA Section 6(b). 
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been the subjects of proposed legislation to reduce the protections available to 
manufacturers.262  But they have endured unchanged for over twenty years against 
such challenges and have become part of the consumer product safety “landscape.” 
The approach of the Firearms Safety Act towards information disclosure is, not 
surprisingly, different from that of the CPSA.  Section 401(b) of the Act requires the 
Attorney General to collect and maintain current production and sales figures for 
licensed manufacturers of firearms and break those production and sales figures 
down by the model, caliber, and type of firearm produced by the manufacturer 
including a list of the serial numbers of such firearms.  (The reason why such records 
contribute to safety is mysterious, but not inconsistent with an agenda of maximizing 
the authority of the Attorney General over the firearms industry.)  The Firearms 
Safety Act not only contains nothing resembling the protections of CPSA Section 
6(b), but affirmatively requires the Attorney General to make public the information 
collected by this section.263  The obvious potential of such public release of 
information to harm the competitive prospects of firearms manufacturers264 probably 
did not trouble the sponsors of the Firearms Safety Act in the slightest. 
11.  Private Enforcement and Remedies 
Both the CPSA and the Firearms Safety Act specify what effect actions taken or 
not taken under both acts will have on civil actions for damages.  Both the CPSA and 
the Firearms Safety Act also provide for enforcement by persons other than the 
Commission and the Attorney General, respectively.  As is the case with so much 
else in the Firearms Safety Act, its provisions are much more onerous to the 
regulated community than are similar sections of the CPSA. 
The CPSA states that compliance with consumer product safety standards, or 
with other Commission orders or rules, does not relieve a person from liability at 
common law or under a state statute.265  Moreover, the failure of the Commission to 
take any action or commence a proceeding under the CPSA is not admissible in 
litigation at common law or under a state statute that relates to that consumer 
product.266  The Firearms Safety Act has a similar section on civil liability,267 but it 
also contains a separate section that gives any person “aggrieved” by any violation of 
the Act or the regulations specified by it to bring an action in U.S. district court for 
damages, including consequential damages.268  The Act does not define the term 
                                                                
262The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 1987, H.R. 3343, 100th Cong. 1st 
Sess. sponsored by Representative James Florio (D-N.J.) contained a change in Section 6(b) 
that would have permitted the Commission to have released information subject to the 
disclosure restrictions of that section as long as the Commission accompanied the release with 
a disclaimer. 
263S.1224, § 401(c).   
264It is not clear whether the general statutory prohibition on release of private trade secret 
information codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000) would be applicable to the Firearms Safety 
Act. 
265CPSA § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2000). 
266CPSA § 251(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000). 
267S.1224, § 306. 
268S.1224, § 304. 
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“aggrieved,” evidently leaving it to case law to sort out which private citizens will be 
permitted to harass the firearms industry under the Act, but it does give the court the 
discretion to award a prevailing plaintiff (although not a prevailing defendant) 
reasonable attorney’s fees.269  It also makes clear that its remedy is in addition to any 
remedy provided by common law or under Federal or State law,270  including 
presumably the separate right that the Firearms Safety Act gives “interested persons” 
to bring actions to enforce the Firearms Safety Act themselves.271  Since civil actions 
seeking to impose liability on the firearms industry or individual firearm 
manufacturers have become one mechanism by which anti-gun groups have sought 
to cripple the firearms industry,272 the Firearms Safety Act would give such plaintiffs 
one more count to state in their complaints. 
The CPSA explicitly permits interested persons (including individuals, nonprofit, 
business and other entities) to bring actions to enforce consumer product safety rules 
or an order issued by the Commission under CPSA Section 15, and authorizes the 
court to award reasonable attorney’s and expert witness fees.273  The Firearms Safety 
Act has a similar section.274  The CPSA, however, permits such private enforcement 
only where the Commission or the Attorney General has failed to exercise a “right of 
first refusal” after notice given by the prospective plaintiff.275  For the reader who has 
not already guessed it, the Firearms Safety Act contains no such limitation.276  The 
failure to give the Attorney General a right to take over such actions raises the 
possibility that the Firearms Safety Act will be enforced in inconsistent ways in 
different judicial districts and circuits, and would make Attorney General opinions 
interpreting the Act and regulations under it of much less influence.  Inconsistent 
                                                                
269S.1224, § 304(a).  One obvious interpretation of the word “aggrieved” would be a 
person injured by the discharge of a firearm that the plaintiff alleges is not in conformance 
with regulations or somehow violated a recall order. 
270S.1224, § 304(b). 
271S.1224, § 305.  For a discussion of the Firearms Safety Act’s right of private 
enforcement, see infra notes 274, 276 and accompanying text. 
272Examples of such suits, generally brought on some type of a nuisance theory by either a 
private association or by a governmental entity include New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 
No. 00 CV 3641, E.D.N.Y. (2004) (as described in 32 P.S.L.R. 380-81 (2004); NAACP v. 
Accusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391-396 (E.D.NY 2002); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 20-22 (Ill App. 1st Dist. 2002); Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E. 2d 1 6-
9 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2001); King  v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2, 193-195 1222, 1228 
(Ind. 2002); Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2 at 192 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dept (2003); 
James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 359 N.J. Super. 291, 303-05 (N.J. Super. A. D. 2003); D.C. v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 03-CV-24, (D.C. App. 2004), as described in 32 P.S.L.R. 464, 464-
65 (2004), 84 A.2d 1127.  Some plaintiffs have dropped lawsuits after having commenced 
them.  S. Harris, “Cincinnati Drops Suit Against Gun Industry; Suit Deemed Unwinnable and 
Wasteful, 31 P.S.L.R., 427, 427-28 (2003).   
273CPSA § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (2000). 
274S.1224, § 305. 
275CPSA § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (2000). 
276S.1224, § 305(a). 
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interpretations of the Act that work to the disadvantage of the firearms industry are, 
of course, likely one happy byproduct of its operation in the eyes of its sponsors. 
V.  SUMMARY  
The true objective of the Firearms Safety Act is increasingly apparent when one 
compares it to a law that, whatever its flaws, has been reasonably successful in 
reducing the number of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products.  To 
summarize the most important findings: 
 
1. The Firearms Safety Act assigns its entire regulatory program to a single 
law enforcement official rather than to a regulatory commission. 
2. The Firearms Safety Act does nothing to harmonize any conflicting state 
safety regulations and even promotes inconsistent regulation. 
3. Rulemaking under the Firearms Safety Act is conducted under the most 
basic notice and comment with a preposterously short time period 
between proposed rules and final rules. 
4. Regulations contemplated by the Firearms Safety Act are extremely 
prescriptive, leaving the firearms industry the least room for innovation. 
5. There is no requirement that the Attorney General even consider, let alone 
defer to, voluntary standards, despite the fact that SAAMI has developed a 
detailed set of such standards at the request of Congress for three-quarters 
of a century. 
6. The Firearms Safety Act confers extraordinary authority on the Attorney 
General through a delegation of authority by negative implication that 
leaves the Attorney General free to do almost anything he or she pleases 
in the name of firearm safety. 
7. There is no procedure specified in the Firearms Safety Act for recalls and 
the election of remedies section central to the recall structure of the CPSA 
does not exist. 
8. The level of hazard that justifies regulations, recalls and expedited 
“imminent hazard” proceedings under the Firearms Safety Act are 
difficult to distinguish, raising the question of why the Attorney General 
would seek to publish regulations at all and not just proceed with a series 
of imminent hazard and recall actions. 
9. The Firearms Safety Act completely exempts governments and 
governmental officials from its application, an almost inconceivable 
exemption if the true objective of the Firearms Safety Act is safe firearms. 
10. The Firearms Safety Act creates an entirely new private cause of action 
for persons “aggrieved” by violations of the Act, and also allows for 
private enforcement without any sort of right on the part of even the 
Attorney General to take over cases to try and have some type of 
consistent interpretation. 
 
Supporters of the Firearms Safety Act seek to make a virtue out of the loose to 
non-existent procedures and standards of that Act.  In arguing that the Commission 
should not have jurisdiction over firearms safety, and the Department of the Treasury 
(which would now be the Department of Justice because of the transfer of BATFE to 
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the Department of Justice) should have, the Violence Policy Center notes the follow 
aspects of Commission procedure and findings:277
 
1. the necessity for the Commission to issue an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking; 
2. the necessity for the Commission to defer to voluntary standards in certain 
cases; 
3. the necessity for the Commission to conduct cost-benefit analysis as part 
of two of its three stages of rulemaking; 
4. the restrictions imposed by CPSA Section 6(b) on the release of 
information by the Commission. 
 
There are two assumptions implicit in the arguments of the Violence Policy Center.  
The first is that firearms regulations are unlikely to be justified if the Commission 
conducted the types of analysis required by the CPSA, but which the Violence Policy 
Center believes to be unwarranted.  The second is that extensive analysis is not 
justified, because firearms are so much more dangerous than other consumer 
products that standards of regulation that apply to consumer products ought not to be 
applied to firearms.  It is, of course, just as plausible to contend that the political 
significance of firearms as weapons (“arms” in the language of the Second 
Amendment) is sufficiently great that the government should be particularly 
scrupulous about any regulation purporting to be for the purpose of safety regulation; 
hence it is especially important that any safety regulation be subject to the 
requirements of the CPSA.   
The Commission has, in any event, had experience in dealing with products that 
pose safety hazards of the magnitude of firearms.  As noted earlier in this article, 
there is no doubt that firearms can be dangerous.  In 2000 there were 776 deaths 
from accidental discharge of firearms, and an additional 230 deaths from the 
discharge of firearms where the intent could not be determined.278  The number of 
deaths from the accidental discharge of firearms could, therefore, be as high as 1006, 
although a more reasonable estimate is 783.279  There were an additional 23,237 
nonfatal injuries that year associated with unintentional firearms discharges.280  There 
are an estimated 200 million firearms in the United States, including 65-70 million 
                                                                
277Violence Policy Center, “The Treasury Department is Better Equipped than the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission to Regulate the Gun Industry,” 
http:www.vpc.org/fact_sht/treascp.htm. 
278National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 50, No. 15, 
p. 69 (2002). 
279Normal Commission practice is to allocate unknown causes in the same percentage as 
known causes.  In this case, since the overwhelming percentage of deaths from firearm 
discharges are suicide and homicide, only a few of the unknown causes would likely be from 
accidental discharge. 
280Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 
“Unintentional Firearm Gunshot Nonfatal Injuries and Rates per 100,000” 
http://webappa.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe.  That number dropped to 17,579 in 2002, the last 
year for which injury figures are available.  (Death data typically lags two years behind injury 
data because of different methods of collection.) 
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handguns.  Between 60 and 65 million Americans own firearms, of which 30-35 
million own handguns.281  
Although the number of deaths and injuries associated with firearms are 
significant, they are not so high as to be outside the realm of the risk of death and 
injury that the Commission faces in other products.  For example, the Commission 
staff estimates that there were 634 deaths and 110,100 injuries associated with the 
use of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in 2001.  (In 2002 the number of estimated injuries 
climbed to 113,900).282  The Commission estimates that there are approximately 5.6 
million ATVs in use.283  Another product associated with large numbers of deaths 
and injuries is the ignition of upholstered furniture.  The Commission staff estimates 
that in 1998 (the last year for which data are available) there were 420 deaths and 
1,080 injuries associated with the 6,200 fires in upholstered furniture started by 
either small open flames or smoldering cigarettes.  The Commission staff also 
estimates that there are approximately 400 million pieces of upholstered furniture in 
the U.S. 284  The figures for ATVs and upholstered furniture demonstrate that the 
Commission is experienced in examining risks of the magnitude posed by the 
accidental discharge of firearms.285  The most plausible explanation, therefore, for 
reticence of the advocates of the Firearms Safety Act to entrust firearms safety 
regulation to the Commission is their fear that the procedures that the Commission 
must follow and the findings that the Commission is required to make would not 
support the onerousness of regulation that they would like to impose on the firearms 
industry. 
                                                                
281National Rifle Association Firearms Fact Sheet 2004, citing Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.  http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/ 
Read.aspx?ID=83. 
282U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, “Annual Report:  All-Terrain Vehicles 
(ATV)-Related Deaths and Injuries,” October 24, 2003, pp. 4-6.  (on file with U.S. Consumer 
Products Safety Commission). 
283U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, All-Terrain Vehicle 2001 Injury & 
Exposure Studies (January 2003). 
28468 Fed. Reg. 60629, 60630-31 (2003). 
285In the case of upholstered furniture the Commission began a rulemaking proceeding in 
1994 designed to cover the hazard of small open-flame ignition.  59 Fed. Reg. 30735 (1994).  
In 1994 the Commission decided to defer action on the hazard of smoldering (cigarette) 
ignition to evaluate the results of an industry voluntary standard.  Id.  In 2003 the Commission 
amended its original advance notice of proposed rulemaking to include both the hazards of 
small open-flame ignition and smoldering (cigarette) ignition.  68 Fed. Reg. 60629, 60680-31.  
The situation is more complicated in the case of ATVs.  The Commission terminated 
rulemaking in 1991 in reliance on the consent decrees reached in 1988 with major distributors 
of ATVs.  When those consent decrees expired in 1998 the Commission negotiated voluntary 
undertakings with the distributors and manufacturers.  In 2002 the Commission was petitioned 
by Consumer Federation of America to undertake additional rulemaking on ATVs.  The 
Commission has yet to act on that petition. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress has historically left firearms safety to a combination of voluntary 
standards and the civil tort system.286  Efforts to subject firearms and ammunition to 
regulations developed and enforced by an administrative agency have met with 
Congressional resistance, except for the “point system” that has been administered 
by the BATFE for imported handguns since 1968.  This is, in one sense, surprising, 
because the public has generally become increasingly risk averse since the 1960’s.  
Firearms certainly pose a risk, from accidental discharges, suicide, and criminal 
misuse.  But the U.S. tradition of private firearms ownership287 supported and 
protected by an effective lobbying organization has successfully resisted placing 
firearms in the category of consumer products subject to safety regulation.  This 
resistance has been bolstered by declining injury and death rates due to accidental 
firearms discharges for the past seventy years.288
Proposed legislation such as the Firearms Safety Act starkly illustrates the point 
of the somewhat tongue-in-cheek title of this article.  The proponents of the Firearms 
Safety Act seem persuaded that the “safest” firearm is one in hands other than those 
of a private citizen consumer.289  Granting the Attorney General virtually plenary 
authority over the firearms industry can limit consumer choice in firearms and may 
substantially increase both the economic and “hassle-factor” cost of owning firearms.  
But, in the point of view of the proponents of this legislation, that is as it should be.  
Firearms confer capabilities on their users, to the extent of their skill with the firearm 
                                                                
286There have been attempts to change the civil tort system to prevent certain types of suits 
against the firearms industry.  On April 9, 2003 the House of Representatives passed the 
Lawful Commerce in Firearms Act, H.R. 1036.  Cong. Rec. H.2995-2998 (2003).  On March 
2, 2004 the Senate rejected the bill (S.1805), after an amendment was added to it extending the 
ban on military look-alike firearms (“assault weapons”).  U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 108th 
Congress-2nd Session, “On passage of S.1805 as amended:  Bill Defeated.” 
287For a discussion of the origins and history of the American tradition of private firearms 
ownership, see DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE AND THE COWBOY 303-73 (1992).  
For a discussion of the constitutional basis for private firearms ownership, see STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 55-
88 and 99-154 (1994). 
288Since 1930 the annual number of accidental deaths associated with firearms use has 
decreased 75%.  Among children, fatal firearms accidents have decreased 91% since 1975.  
The per capita rate of accidental deaths associated with firearms use has declined 91% since 
its all time high in 1904.  National Rifle Association-Institute for Legislative Action 2004 
Firearms Facts.  Http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=83, citing National 
Center for Health Statistics and National Safety Council.  For a recitation of the latest numbers 
of deaths and injuries associated with the use of firearms, see supra notes 278 – 280 and 
accompanying text. 
289Ironically, the point of view of the proponents of the Firearms Safety Act is best 
summarized by an author who strongly favors the private ownership of firearms.  Lt. Col. Jeff 
Cooper (USMC-Ret.) stated:  “[i]f a person felt that safety were the first consideration in 
handling weapons, he would never handle one. . .”  COOPER, supra note 19, at 84.  Col. 
Cooper continues his sentence, however:  “[a]nd thus achieve the dubious felicity of placing 
himself in greater danger from his foes than from his own weapons.”  Id.  The proponents of 
the Firearms Safety Act have no doubts about the felicity of consumers deprived of firearms in 
the name of safety. 
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and their judgment in using it.  The proponents of the Firearms Safety Act do not 
trust ordinary private citizen consumers to use firearms either skillfully or wisely; 
hence they are better off, “safer,” if you like, without those instruments.  Persons 
who hold a higher opinion of the levels of skill and judgment of their fellow citizens 
ought to recognize, and to oppose, legislation such as the Firearms Safety Act, as 
“gun control,” with a different title.  
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